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Author: 莊聰益
Tsung-i Chuang
Thesis Title: 符合EPC第二代第一類標準的無線射頻辨識之認證協定
An RFID Authentication Protocol for EPC Class 1 Generation 2 Standard
Advisor: 楊維寧
Wei-ning Yang
Committee: 羅乃維
Nai-wei Lo
陳雲岫
Yun-shiow Chen
葉國暉
Kuo-hui Yeh
林建雄
Chien-hsiung Lin
Degree: 博士
Doctor
Department: 管理學院 - 管理研究所
Graduate Institute of Management
Thesis Publication Year: 2014
Graduation Academic Year: 103
Language: 英文
Pages: 37
Keywords (in Chinese): 雙向認證EPC隱私無線射頻辨識安全
Keywords (in other languages): Authentication, EPC, Privacy, RFID, Security
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  • 隨著無線射頻辨識技術被廣泛地應用於我們的日常生活,如何在無線射頻辨識相關的應用上,預防違法存取與資料洩漏是相當重要且十分關鍵的, 因此發展一個安全且著重隱私性的無線射頻辨識之認證協定則是有其必要性。最近,Lin等人提出了一個符合EPC第二代第一類標準的無線射頻辨識之雙向認證協定,藉以提供更周全的資料機密性,以及更強健的系統安全與運算效能。然而,在我們所模擬的一連串主動攻擊下,我們發現Lin等人所提出之雙向認證協定,在安全性上並未如其所宣稱般的強健。因此我們發展了一個嶄新的無線射頻辨識之雙向認證協定,在與Lin等人之認證協定具有相同計算複雜度下,可達到更強化之安全性,同時能夠有效預防標籤追蹤與秘密洩漏之威脅。


    As RFID technology has emerged in our daily life, the prevention of illegal access and information leakage of RFID based applications becomes a practical requirement. A more secure and privacy aware RFID authentication protocol is devastatingly needed. Recently, Lin et al. proposed a mutual RFID authentication scheme conforming EPC Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC GEN 2) standard to deliver strong data privacy, robust system security and computation efficiency. However, their claimed security cannot hold. In this dissertation, we demonstrate how to break through Lin et al.’s authentication scheme by engaging a series of active attack procedures. The computational complexities of identified attacks are practical so that Lin et al.’s scheme cannot improve security any more than the EPC GEN 2 standard. Furthermore, we develop a new RFID authentication protocol to enhance security density, prevent threats of tag tracing and secrecy disclosure, and achieve the similar computational cost as Lin et al.’s protocol does.

    教授推薦書. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 論文口試委員審定書. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . ii 中文摘要. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . iv 致謝. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi List of Tables . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 RFID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1 Components of an RFID system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.2 Interface of an RFID system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2.1.3 EPC Class 1 Generation 2 Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 2.2 Cryptanalysis of Lin et al.’s Protocol . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.1 Preliminary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.2.2 Secret Disclosure Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2.2.3 Tag Impersonation Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 3 The Proposed Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 作者簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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