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研究生： 沈誦修
Sung-Shiou Shen
論文名稱： 晶片卡與微處理機安全模組之側通道洩漏防制研究
Side-Channel Leakage Prevention Schemes of Smart Card or Microprocessor Based Security Module
指導教授： 邱榮輝
Jung-Hui Chiu
李三良
San-Liang Lee
口試委員: 雷欽隆
Chin-Laung Lei
羅有綱
Yu-Kang Lo
顏嵩銘
Sung-Ming Yen
何煒華
Wei-Hua He
學位類別： 博士
Doctor
系所名稱： 電資學院 - 電子工程系
Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering
論文出版年： 2008
畢業學年度： 96
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 196
中文關鍵詞： 差分電力攻擊 、電磁波洩漏攻擊 、時間分析攻擊 、統計分析攻擊 、晶片卡 、密碼模組
外文關鍵詞： Differential Power Analysis, Timing Analysis Attack, Smart Card, Security Module
相關次數： 點閱：217  下載：5 
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    • 現今，使用者常利用晶片卡或內含微處理機的密碼模組來保護個人資料。這些硬體密碼模組之保護電路會因廠商的設計或實作疏忽，而造成密碼模組安全性有漏洞而不知。既使廠商宣稱其模組電路有足夠的安全性，但這也無從保證，其電路不會因設計疏忽或新的攻擊技術而被破解。在這種情形之下，必須有一定方式要求工程師在設計或測試電路時，遵循較具安全性之設計原則，以提升模組電路的安全性。就攻擊者而言，他們也會不斷嘗試尋找模組電路的弱點，藉以攻擊破壞模組的安全性，這種抗爭是永無停息。
    論文主要針對嚴重影響資訊安全的側通路洩漏攻擊密碼模組技術，特別是與電力相關的攻擊技術，例如電力消耗曲線攻擊、電磁輻射分析攻擊等，提出三種防禦電力式側通路洩漏攻擊之方案。
    1. 以平衡電路設計搭配雜訊覆蓋之防禦電力攻擊方案：此平衡式電路將被整合進密碼模組內，以平衡密碼模組電力消耗，降低經由電力消耗而洩漏之訊號值，再加上雜訊覆蓋，以增加攻擊者的困難度。
    2.光耦合電路設計之防禦電力攻擊方案：另一保護側通路洩漏攻擊密碼模組之方法，是利用光耦合電路設計。利用光耦合觀念，可以將提供密碼模組能量的電源線改成光線，使得該密碼模組無外接電源線，徹底消除電力攻擊可能。此種方法也將降低電磁輻射，與隔離模組內部訊號經電磁耦合，藉由匯流排洩漏的可能性。
    3.密碼器時變金鑰設計之防禦電力攻擊方案：傳統區塊密碼器(block cipher)之金鑰都是固定的。這讓DPA攻擊者能夠收集到，在相同金鑰下足夠之電力消耗曲線，而能以較高機率分析攻擊。本論文所提之時變金鑰設計，因具有一直在改變之金鑰，讓DPA攻擊者無法收集到相同金鑰下之足夠電力消耗曲線，而無法做統計分析，而達到防禦電力攻擊目的

    Smart card or microprocessor based security modules are used today to keep user secret of information confidential. However, some chip manufacturers do not pay enough attention to the proper design and testing of security mechanisms. Even where they claim their products are highly secure, they do not guarantee this and do not take any responsibility if a device is compromised. In this situation, it is crucial for the design engineer to have a convenient and reliable method of testing the security of chips. By comparison, hackers constantly try to break through implemented protections using the vulnerabilities of the design, consequently a continuous battle is waged between manufacturers and hacker community.
    This thesis investigates a field of information security that is of growing importance: the prevention of side-channel cryptanalysis of security modules. Specifically, it focuses on the prevention of power analysis attacks which include the information leakages from power consumption and electromagnetic radiation. A theoretical background is presented, followed by experiments that show practical implementations of power analysis attacks.
    The main contribution of the thesis includes three prevention schemes that are proposed to reduce the risks from side-channel leakage as follows:
    1. Balanced Circuits with Noise Masking Prevention Scheme: Balance circuits as one of countermeasures, is designed to balance the power consumption of the security module and the adding of a masking noise to hide the balance signal. Normally, power lines are necessary for every electronics module that makes the power analysis attack possible.
    2. Photo-coupling Prevention Scheme: Adopting photo-coupling techniques using LED with photovoltaic cells and photo-couplers to isolate the power lines of the system. Moreover, information leakages from conduction lines including the power lines of smart cards, I/O bus, and clock lines can be prevented. In addition, radiation leakages can also be reduced using embedded metal plates.
    3. Time-Varying Key Prevention Scheme: The conventional block ciphers use a fixed encryption key. This makes a DPA attack high possibility. The proposed authenticated encryption scheme using a time-varying key can overcome such drawback to prevent the side channel power analysis.

    Abstract I Background and Previous Research 1 Background and Motivation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . 3 1.1 Previous work and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2 The subject of hardware security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3 Motivation and overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 6 2 Side-Channel Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 7 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Timing Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3 Differential Fault Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 2.4 Electromagnetic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5 Power Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.5.1 SPA and DPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 2.5.2 High Order DPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.5.3 Summary of Power Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 2.6 Summary of Side-Channel Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20 3 Smart Cards 21 3.1 Technical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2 Smart Card’s Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 II Experiments 27 4 Simple Power Analysis and Differential Power Analysis 29 4.1 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 4.2 Background - The DES Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....31 4.3 Data Acquisition Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3.1 Equipment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 4.3.2 DES Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.3.3 Data Acquisition Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4.3.4 Data Analysis Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......48 5 Noise Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......49 5.1 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...49 5.2 Noise Reduction Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.3 Results of Noise Reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 5.4 Improving the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.5 Results of Attacks on DES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 III Proposed Countermeasure Schemes 61 6 Balanced Circuits with Noise Masking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 6.1 Introduction to Current Countermeasure of Power Analysis Attack. . .....64 6.2 Balanced Circuits with Noise Masking Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 6.2.1 Current Countermeasure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 6.2.2 Balanced Circuits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6.2.3 Balanced Circuits with Noise Masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......70 6.3 Results of Balanced Circuits with Noise Masking . . . . . . . . . . .....72 7 Photo-coupling Prevention Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 7.1 Introduction to Optical Prevention Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..74 7.2 Optical Prevention Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 7.2.1 Photovoltaic Cell and Photo-coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 7.2.2 Structure of Optical Prevention Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 7.2.2.1 Structure of Countermeasure for Electromagnetic Wave Leakage 81 7.2.2.2 Structure of Countermeasure for Bus Leakage 83 7.3 Simulation Experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 7.4 Results of Optical Prevention Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 8 Time-Varying Key Prevention Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 8.1 Introduction to Time-Varying Key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 8.2 Time-Varying Key Block Cipher Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 8.2.1 Scheme of TVK Mode of Operation 97 8.3 The Algorithm of the Time-Varying Key Block Cipher Model. . . . . . . ...98 8.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 IV. Future Work and Conclusion 105 9 Other Issues to be Studied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 9.1 Balanced circuit embedded into RFID tag immunity against DPA 108 9.2 Simplify Time-Varying Key scheme for RFID tag. . . . . . . . . . . . . .110 9.3 Photo-coupling combining with detection circuit to detect invasion 111 10 Conclusions 113 Reference 115 Appendix A Source Code Listing 121 A.1 DES Algorithm Implementation on Microcontroller. . . . . . . . . . . . 121 A.2 Acquisition Software: The GUI program of DPA . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 128 A.3 DPA Experiment GUI Interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 B Noise Reduction 179

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