為了促進房貸人員之間的協調，本研究以Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman（2004）提出之決策權分派理論，為房貸作業流程設計理想的組織架構；此外，為了使代理人與委託人之目標一致，以Milgrom and Roberts（1992）提出之誘因契約理論，為房貸人員設計合適的績效管理制度。統計實證結果如下：
1.若業務與徵信任務採取專業化分工，以及將營業單位與作業單位分開，將有助於房貸績效的提升。
2.對業務人員之「過件率」應採取相對績效標準，對於「客戶滿意度」指標應採取絕對績效標準；針對徵授信人員之「徵信報告品質」指標則可採取絕對績效標準，如此將能有效提升業務與徵授信人員之績效。
3.業務人員各項績效指標之權重與獎金發放應由高至低如下排名：(1)撥貸量 (2)過件率 (3)客戶滿意度，因此銀行在決定房貸業務人員績效指標之權重與獎金發放高低，符合上述績效指標之誘因強度排名時，將有助於房貸績效之提升。

To facilitate the coordination among the employees in the mortgage loan department, we apply the decision rights assignment theory (Brickley, Smith & Zimmerman, 2004) to design an optimal organizational architecture for the mortgage loan processing. To align the interests between agent and principle, this thesis also apply the incentive contract theory to devise a performance management system (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) for employees in the mortgage loan department. Three empirical results are derived in the followings.
First, the mortgage’s profit would be higher if banks adopt specialized task assignment between salesmen and credit analyzer, same as the business and operation units. Second, the mortgage’s profit would be better if banks use the relative measure for passed rate and the absolute measure for customer’s satisfaction to measure salesmen’s performance. As to credit analyzer, it would be better to use the absolute measure for the quality of credit reports. Third, the weight of each performance measure should be in the following decreasing order: (1) the amount of loan, (2) passed rate, (3) customer’s satisfaction. The fitter of the actual intensity of incentive of salesmen’s performance measures to ideal one, the better performance of mortgage loan.

一、 網站部份
1. 中央銀行 http://www.cbc.gov.tw/
2. 公開資訊觀測站http://newmops.tse.com.tw/
3. 行政院金融監督管理委員會 http://www.fscey.gov.tw/
二、 中文文獻
1. 銀行授信實務概要編輯委員會編著（2005），銀行授信實務概要，台北市，臺灣金融研訓院。
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