在台灣員工認股權一直是高科技產業公司用來獎勵員工一重要制度，本研究主要探討員工認股權數對公司績效的關係，是屬於訊息效果或是激勵效果，並提出三個調節變數－資本密集度、人力資本重要性、成長機會，分析員工認股權數與公司績效上是否有調節效果。本研究以2003至2007年有發放員工認股權的上市櫃公司為研究樣本，資料來源為台灣經濟新報及公開資訊觀測站，並使用SPSS統計軟體進行迴歸分析。
實證結果顯示，員工認股權數對當年市值有顯著正相關關係，代表有訊息效果；在員工的激勵效果上，結果發現第二、三年對當年度的資產報酬率的差有有顯著正相關關係。三個調節變數中，只有成長機會有顯著的調節效果，可知當成長機會愈高，會加強員工認股權數與公司當年市值的正向關係。

Many firms in Taiwan, especially those in the high-tech industry, issue employee stock options (ESOs) to reward and motivate employees. Hoping to better understand the relationship between the number of ESOs and corporate performance, the research has chosen as samples companies that issued ESOs from 2003 to 2007 to analyze if the relationship is of a signal-effect nature or of an incentive-effect nature. Furthermore, we would like to know if it is moderated by any of the following three moderating variables—capital intensity, importance of human capital, and growth opportunity. The data of the sampled companies are collected from the database of the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and the Market Observation Post System (M.O.P.S), and are processed by linear regression analysis with SPSS.
As our empirical results show, the number of ESOs is significantly and positively correlated with the company’s market value of the launch year, which proves the existence of a signal effect. It is also significantly and positively correlated with the difference between the following two years’ respective Return on Assets (ROA) and that of the launch year; that is to say, an incentive effect exists, too. Among the three moderating variables, only growth opportunity has a significant moderating effect: high opportunity strengthens the positive relationship between the number of ESOs and the market value.

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