台灣的稅制於1998 年開始，正式實施兩稅合一並採用全額設算扣抵制。在全額設算扣
抵制度下，當公司企業繳納營業所得稅後，股東分配到的股利只需要補繳營業所得稅與個人
所得稅之間的差額即可，如此一來，公司企業所支付的營業所得稅等於是股東所得稅的預付
稅款，也消除了以往古典稅制下稅負過於沉重的問題。
然而，行政院於2014 年2 月24 日向立法院提出稅改方案，希望透過調高徵稅額來解決
預算赤字的問題，健全公共財政系統。立法院於2014 年6 月4 日通過了新的稅改方案，取
消全額設算扣抵制，改為採用部分設算扣抵制，並於2015 年1 月1 日正式生效，在部分設
算扣抵制下，股東個人所得稅的扣抵額度將從原本的100%減少為50%，由於股東的稅後現
金流量減少，管理者考量到股東的利益，較有誘因去從事避稅活動。
另外，近年來國內外公司企業的董事會組成的多元化已逐漸成為重要的議題之一，董事
會組成的多元化中尤其以女性董事的比例最受到關注，根據金融監督管理委員會之董事會性
別分析顯示，臺灣公開發行上市櫃公司及興櫃公司的女性董事比例有逐年升高的現象(2013
年：11.83%、2014 年：12.46%、2015 年：12.57%、2016 年：13.07%)，可見臺灣許多公司開
始任用女性董事或增加其任用人數已逐漸形成趨勢。
而公司企業的稅務部門通常需要定期向董事會報告目前的稅務狀況，以制定相關的稅務
管理政策，所以董事會成員對於公司企業的避稅行為具有一定的影響力。相較於男性董事，
女性董事的風險偏好程度通常較低，擔心避稅活動造成日後更大的損失，所以她們傾向於遵
守相關的納稅規定。先前的學者也發現，女性董事能減少代理問題的發生，若避稅活動本身
屬於一種管理者的自利行為，則女性董事對於公司的避稅活動會加以抑制。
最後，本研究的結果顯示2015 年稅制改革後，財稅差異數會減少，代表公司企業的避
稅活動會降低，與研究假說預期的變動相反，但未達統計上的顯著水準，所以稅制改革後避
稅活動的變化尚不明顯。另外，以全體女性董事對於避稅行為的影響來看仍不明確，不過本
研究根據女性董事與其他董事成員間是否具有親屬關係來做分類，進一步測試後發現無親屬
關係之女性董事對於避稅活動具有顯著抑制效果，與研究假說相符，代表無親屬關係之女性
董事擁有較高的獨立性，透過減少避稅行為來避免代理問題發生，進而強化公司治理。

The full dividend imputation system was adopted since 1998 in Taiwan. Under this system,shareholders only need to cover the difference between operating income tax and personal incometax. In this way, the operating income tax just like a prepayment for shareholder’s income tax,which also eliminates the problem of double taxation under the classical tax system.
However, on February 24, 2014, the Executive Yuan proposed a tax reform plan to the Legislative Yuan, hoping to solve the budget deficit problem and improve the public financial system. The Legislative Yuan passed a new tax reform plan on June 4, 2014, canceling the full
dividend imputation system and replacing it with a partial dividend imputation system. It was formally effective on January 1, 2015. The dividend imputation credit for personal income tax will be reduced from 100% to 50%. The manager considers the interests of shareholders and has incentives to engage in tax avoidance activities.
In addition, the board’s diversity has gradually become an important issue in recent years.Especially, the proportion of female directors has attracted the most attention. According to the Financial Supervision and Management Committee’s report, the proportion of female directors in publicly listed companies in Taiwan has increased year by year (2013: 11.83%, 2014: 12.46%,2015: 12.57%, 2016: 13.07%), showing that a trend to start appointment of female directors or increase their number of appointments.
The tax department of a company usually needs to report the current tax status to the board and formulate tax management policies. Therefore, the board members have a influence on the tax avoidance. Compared to male directors, female directors generally have lower levels of risk preference, so they tend to comply with tax regulations. Previous research have also found that if the tax avoidance like a self-interest behavior of managers, the female directors will suppress the
company's tax avoidance activities and reduce the agency problems.
Finally, this study found that the number of fiscal and tax differences will decrease after tax reform,but it has not reached a statistically significant level, therefore, the change of tax avoidance are still not obvious. In addition, it is still unclear that female director’s influence on tax avoidance.However, this research further classifies the relationship between female directors and other members. We found that if female directors don’t have relationship with other members, they will have a negative effect on tax avoidance. This effect is correspond to the research hypothesis, which means that female directors who have no relationship can avoid agency problems by reducing tax avoidance, thus strengthening corporate governance.

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