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Author: 賴奕亘
I-Hsuan Lai
Thesis Title: 稅制改革下經理人薪酬與避稅之關連性分析
Executive Compensation and Tax Avoidance : Evidence from Tax Reform in Taiwan
Advisor: 郭啟賢
Chii-Shyan Kuo
Committee: 呂志豪
Shih-Hao Lu
陳崇文
Chung-Wen Chen
Degree: 碩士
Master
Department: 管理學院 - 企業管理系
Department of Business Administration
Thesis Publication Year: 2020
Graduation Academic Year: 108
Language: 中文
Pages: 49
Keywords (in Chinese): 兩稅合一避稅行為公司治理經理人薪酬企業價值
Keywords (in other languages): Dividend imputation credit, Tax avoidance, Corporate Governance, CEO compensation, Firm value
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  • 本研究以 2015~2018 年間的上市(櫃)公司為樣本,以有效稅率及現金有效稅 率作為避稅程度之代理變數,探討經理人的現金薪酬對企業避稅行為的影響。研究結果發現,當企業給付經理人越多的現金薪酬,公司有效稅率與現金有效稅率皆會提高,意味著現金薪酬的發放,會抑制經理人投入避稅活動,符合我們的預期。再者,我國自 2018 年起廢除設算扣抵制度,此舉將造成股東稅後現金流量減少,公司經理人可能會基於股東的立場,從事較多避稅行為。本研究顯示,稅制改革後企業的有效稅率與現金有效稅率皆有所降低,代表稅改後公司從事較多的避稅活動,並且弱化了薪酬與稅率之正向關係。
    此外,本研究發現避稅可以提升企業價值,考量公司治理後,避稅程度越大的企業,其價值會更高。同時,本研究佐證,稅改後公司的避稅活程度提高,也進而增長了企業價值。


    This study uses Taiwan-listed companies as samples from 2015 to 2018. I use cash and GAAP effective tax rate to proxy for tax avoidance, this study examines the relationship between executive compensation and tax avoidance. The results show that the more cash compensation CEO were paid, the higher cash and GAAP effective tax rate were. The adoption of cash compensation will mitigate the incentive that CEO engaged in corporate tax avoidance. Additionally, Taiwan has changed her tax system from partial dividend imputation system (partial DIS) to classical tax system starting in 2018. This change causes the cash flows after tax to shareholders to increase. This motives managers to engage in tax avoidance activities to a greater extent. This research concludes that both cash and GAAP effective tax rate have been reduced after tax reform. Meanwhile, our research suggests that the abolition of DIS will strengthen the relationship between cash compensation and tax avoidance.
    In addition, this study found that tax avoidance can enhance the value of firm. After considering corporate governance, the greater the degree of tax avoidance, the higher the value of the firm. At the same time, this study corroborates that the increased tax avoidance activity of the company after tax reform has further increased the value of the company.

    誌謝 ............................................................................................................ I 摘要 ........................................................................................................... II Abstract .......................................................................................................... III 圖表目錄 ........................................................................................................... V 第一章 緒論.................................................................................................... 1 第一節、 研究背景與動機........................................................................ 1 第二節、 制度背景.................................................................................... 2 第三節、 研究問題與目的........................................................................ 3 第四節、 研究流程.................................................................................... 5 第二章 文獻回顧與研究假說........................................................................ 6 第一節、 避稅............................................................................................ 6 第二節、 代理理論與經理人薪酬............................................................ 7 第三節、 稅改下的經理人薪酬與避稅.................................................... 9 第三章 研究方法.......................................................................................... 12 第一節、 研究樣本.................................................................................. 12 第二節、 變數定義.................................................................................. 12 第三節、 迴歸模型.................................................................................. 18 第四章 實證結果.......................................................................................... 19 第一節、 敘述統計分析.......................................................................... 19 第二節、 相關性分析.............................................................................. 23 第三節、 主測試實證分析...................................................................... 26 第五章 增額測試.......................................................................................... 30 第六章 結論與建議...................................................................................... 36 第一節、 研究結論.................................................................................. 36 第二節、 研究限制與建議...................................................................... 37 第七章 參考文獻.......................................................................................... 38

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