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研究生: 鄒佳偉
Chia-Wei Tsou
論文名稱: 檢測虛假數據注入攻擊於工業控制系統場域
False Data Injection Attacks Detection on Industrial Control Systems
指導教授: 馬奕葳
Yi-Wei Ma
陳俊良
Jiann-Liang Chen
口試委員: 柯志亨
Chih-Heng Ke
陳永昇
Yong-Sheng Chen
黎碧煌
Bi-Huang Li
馬奕葳
Yi-Wei Ma
陳俊良
Jiann-Liang Chen
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 電資學院 - 電機工程系
Department of Electrical Engineering
論文出版年: 2023
畢業學年度: 111
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 46
中文關鍵詞: 工業控制系統網路安全虛假數據注入攻擊攻擊檢測
外文關鍵詞: Industrial Control System, Cyber Security, False Data Injection Attack, Attack Detection
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  • 隨著工業控制系統(Industrial Control System, ICS)遭受攻擊導致重大危害的事件頻傳,人們越來越重視 ICS 的網路安全。為此本研究改進了現有的主動檢測機制,並提出一被動-主動混合檢測系統以檢測針對 ICS 的虛假數據注入攻擊(False Data InjectionAttack, FDIA)。由於現有營運實踐中不容易檢測到 FDIA,本研究提出的方法除了通過利用被動接收的系統資料與預先定義的規則進行比對以檢測攻擊外,還通過控制致動器發起主動式檢測以發掘攻擊者,以完整檢測針對 ICS 的發起的 FDIA;與其餘研究不同的是本研究通過風險動態調整發起主動檢測之頻率,以求在低風險時降低對營運效率的影響,在高風險時減少檢測攻擊所需時間。實驗結果表明,使用本研究提出之系統,在虛假數據與真實數據相差 10%時,能達到 99.9%的檢出率,較隨機發起主動檢測的方法高 22.5%,在虛假數據與真實數據相差 5%時,能達到 95.4%的檢出率,較隨機發起主動檢測的方法高 18.2%,且即使虛假數據與真實數據僅相差 3%時,仍能達到高達 92.9%的檢出率,較隨機發起主動檢測的方法高 16.5%。


    With the increasing occurrence of incidents causing significant damage due to attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS), people pay more and more attention to the cyber security of ICS. This study improves existing active detection mechanisms and proposes an integrated passive-active detection system to detect False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) targeting ICS. Since it is challenging to detect FDIA in current operational practices, the method presented in this research not only compares passive received system data with predefined rules to detect attacks but also launches active detect by controlling actuators to find attackers and achieve comprehensive detection of FDIA targeting ICS. Unlike other studies, this research dynamically adjusts the frequency of launching active detect through risk assessment, aiming to minimize the impact on operational efficiency during low-risk periods and reduce the time required for detecting attacks during high-risk periods. The experimental results show that using the system proposed in this study, when false data differs by 10% from real data, the detection rate can reach 99.9%, which is 22.5% higher than active detect by randomly launch method, when false data differs by 5% from real data, the detection rate can reach 95.4%, which is 18.2% higher than active detect by randomly launch method, and even if false data only differs by 3% from real data, the detection rate can reach 92.9%, which is 16.5% higher than active detect by randomly launch method.

    摘要 I Abstract II Acknowledgment III List of Figures VI List of Tables VIII Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Motivation 1 1.2 Contribution 6 1.3 Chapter Structure 7 Chapter 2 Background and Related Work 9 2.1 Background 9 2.1.1 Industrial Control System (ICS) 9 2.1.2 False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) 10 2.1.3 National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) 12 2.1.4 Passive Detect 12 2.1.5 Active Detect 13 2.2 Related Work 14 Chapter 3 Proposed System Architecture 17 3.1 Assumption 18 3.2 Basis Layer 19 3.2.1 Communication Module 19 3.2.2 Monitor Module 19 3.2.3 Logging Module 20 3.2.4 System Information Module 21 3.2.5 Domain Knowledge Module 23 3.3 Detect Layer 24 3.3.1 Passive Detect Module 25 3.3.2 Active Detect Module 30 3.4 Mark Layer 34 3.4.1 Attack Device Mark Module 35 3.4.2 Affected Degree Mark Module 35 Chapter 4 Performance Analysis 36 4.1 Scenario 36 4.2 Experimental Parameters 36 4.3 Experimental Analysis and Verification 37 Chapter 5 Conclusion and Future Works 41 5.1 Conclusion 41 5.2 Future Works 41 Reference 42

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