長久以來，台灣基層員工薪酬與高階管理者薪酬相比都有較低之情形，這也會讓一般民眾懷疑到高階管理階層薪酬是否能與企業績效之間有正向的關聯性。而當企業本身營運狀況不佳或連年虧損時，若是持續給予高階管理者高薪，更是會讓一般民眾對此有所疑慮。基於上述內容，本研究將利用高階管理者薪酬對Tobin’ s Q、資產報酬率及股東權益報酬率以迴歸模型來進行實證分析，探討高階管理者薪酬與企業績效之間的關聯性。而本研究定義的高階管理者階層分為兩者:高階經理人階層及董監事階層；另外，本研究又將衡量企業績效的指標劃分為三者: Tobin's Q、資產報酬率及股東權益報酬率。
本研究的實證結果顯示高階經理人薪酬不論是在上市全產業或的是上市電子產業的樣本中皆與Tobin’s Q、資產報酬率及股東權益報酬率之間有顯著正相關；相對地，本研究發現不論是在上市全產業或是上市電子產業的樣本中，董監事薪酬都與Tobin’s Q之間並沒有顯著之關聯性。然而卻又發現董監事薪酬皆與資產報酬率及股東權益報酬率之間有顯著正相關。因此從上述中可以得知，在多數的情況下，企業願意提供較高的薪酬於高階管理者或的是依照績效薪給制度時，將能提供高階經理人創造企業績效(價值)極大化的誘因，且同時能降低代理問題的發生。

Compared with the executive management class, the compensation of non-executive employees in Taiwan have been lower for a long time, which will make people think whether the compensation of executive management class can have a positive correlation with enterprise performance or not. And when the company's operating conditions are not well, if the company continues to pay high compensations to executive management class, it will make people think that there is a unfair situation. So, this research will use the regression model to find the correlation between the executive compensation and the enterprise performance based on the above description. The executive management class defined in this study is divided into the following two categories: senior managers class and directors & supervisors’ class. Also, the indicators to measure enterprise performance in this study are divided into three indices: Tobin's Q, ROA and ROE.
The empirical results of this study show that the compensation of senior managers is significantly positively correlated with Tobin's Q, ROA and ROE in both the listed industries and the listed electronics industry. As for the compensation of directors and supervisors, there is no significant correlation with Tobin's Q in the listed industries or in the listed electronics industry. However, there is a significant positive correlation with ROA and ROE. So, we can find the fact that when company is willing to provide higher executive compensations or based on the pay -for- performance system, it not only to provide incentives for executive management members to maximize enterprise performance or enterprise value, but also reduce the agency problems at the same time.

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