本研究利用多元迴歸模型探討並比較在不同類型的自願性資訊揭露指標下，其是否存在公司治理之代理問題，並探討是否符合本研究的假說。除此之外，也進一步探討在不同類型的自願性資訊揭露指標下，其與公司特徵的關聯性。

實證結果顯示，Eng and Mak之自願性資訊揭露指標表現最好，該指標能突顯四種公司治理之代理問題的存在，並且證明內部董事持股比率、政府持股比率及獨立董事的席次比率與自願性揭露程度呈現顯著的正相關；而大股東持股比率與自願性揭露程度呈現顯著的負相關，而在研究假說上僅有內部董事持股比率不符合預期，其他假說皆符合預期。另外，證基會、企業網站及時效性的自願性資訊揭露指標表現最差，前者僅能突顯一種公司治理的代理問題，也就是顯示政府持股比率與自願性揭露程度呈現顯著的正相關，而後兩者完全無法突顯出公司治理的代理問題。

與公司特徵的關聯性上，完整的自願性資訊揭露程度與公司規模、是否選擇前四大會計事務所及獲利能力呈現顯著正相關，並符合預期。證基會的自願性資訊揭露程度僅與公司規模呈現顯著正相關。Eng and Mak之自願性資訊揭露程度與是否選擇前四大會計事務所及獲利能力呈現顯著正相關。企業網站的自願性資訊揭露程度與成長機會、公司規模及獲利能力呈現顯著的正相關，並且符合預期。時效性的自願性資訊揭露程度與成長機會呈現顯著的正相關，並且符合預期。

This study uses the multiple regression model to explore and compare the different types of voluntary disclosure of information under indicators and the existence of the agents of corporate governance issues and to test the hypothesis of the present study. In addition, we would like to further explore the different types of voluntary disclosure of information indicators, the characteristics of the company and its relevance.

The empirical results show that the voluntary Eng and Mak of the information to expose is the best performance indicators. The indicators can highlight four issues of corporate governance in the presence of agents. It also shows that the relationship between the internal shareholding ratio of directors and the ratio of seats and the voluntary act to expose is significant, while major shareholders and shareholding ratio of voluntary disclosure is of a significant negative correlation. Only research on the internal reasoning of shareholding ratio is not in line with expectations, while other inferences are in line with expectations. In addition, card-based Council and the voluntary exposure nature on Company's Web site and the voluntary disclosure of time are the worst performance indicators. It only highlighted the agent of a corporate governance issue, which is that the Government shareholding ratio and the level of voluntary disclosure are related positively, while the latter both did not highlight the issue of corporate governance proxy completely.

In terms of the relevant characteristics of the company, the integrity of the voluntary disclosure is positively related to the level and scale of the company. The choice of top four accounting firms and profitability also showed a significant correlation, and this is in line with expectations. The voluntary card-based Council of the information to reveal and the extent and size of the company alone is significant positive correlation. The Eng and Mak of voluntary disclosure also reveals the significant correlation between the extent of information, the choice of top four accounting firms and profitability. There is a significant positive correlation between the voluntary natures of the Company's Web site information to expose the extent, the growth opportunities, company size and profitability, and this is in line with expectations. There is a significant positive correlation between the voluntary disclosure and growth opportunities.

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