An Empirical Study of the Effect of Various Types of Executive Stock Options on Firm Performance

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研究生：	趙晏儀 Yen-yi Chao
論文名稱：	An Empirical Study of the Effect of Various Types of Executive Stock Options on Firm Performance An Empirical Study of the Effect of Various Types of Executive Stock Options on Firm Performance
指導教授：	王之彥 Jr-Yan Wang
口試委員:	郭家豪 JIA-hao GUO 林丙輝 Bing-Huei Lin 葉仕國 Shih-Kuo Yeh
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	管理學院 - 財務金融研究所 Graduate Institute of Finance
論文出版年：	2008
畢業學年度：	96
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	42
外文關鍵詞：	executive stock options
相關次數：	點閱：260 下載：0
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This thesis analyzes the effect of adopting various types of executive stock options (ESOs) on the firm performance. These types of executive options include plain vanilla options, reload options, and reset options. The results indicate that granting executive stock optioins provides no significant improvement in the firms’ performance. Futhermore, reload options have no evident effect on firm performance when the three types of executive stock options are investigated, and reset options have positive effect on ROA and Abnormal Return but have slightly negative effect on firms’ Tobin’s Q. Finally, in the examinations of comparing the performance of firms that grant reset ESOs and that do not adopt the ESO compensation scheme, the results also demonstrate that Tobin’s Q of firms that adopt reset ESOs is lightly negative with the comparison of firms that do not adopt ESOs.

Contents
Contents II
List of Tables III
List of Figures IV
Introduction                                                   1
Related Literature                                             5
1 In theory side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1 Positive aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
1.2 Negative aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
2 Incentive motivation analyses in empirical side . . . . . . .7
2.1 Positive evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
2.2 Negative or not significant evidence . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Other motivation of adopting ESOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 The motivation of tax benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 The motivation of cash conservation . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Data and Method                                               13
1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . 13
1.1 Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Composition of Samples . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 14
2 Variable Specification . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 15
2.1 Measure of firm performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Regression Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 ESOs vs. No adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
3.2 Plain vanilla option vs. Reload option vs. Reset option . 21
3.3 Reload or Reset ESOs vs. No adoption . . . . . . . . . . .22
Results and analyses                                          23
1 ESOs vs. No adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
2 Plain vanilla options vs. Reload options V.S Reset options .27
3 Reset options vs. No adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Conclusion                                                    33

                                

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