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研究生: 董劭威
Shao-Wei Tung
論文名稱: CCA-Secure Attribute-Based Encryption with Key Escrow Free Property in Cloud Environment
CCA-Secure Attribute-Based Encryption with Key Escrow Free Property in Cloud Environment
指導教授: 黃政嘉
Jheng-Jia Huang
口試委員: 左瑞麟
黃政嘉
曾一凡
王銘宏
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 資訊管理系
Department of Information Management
論文出版年: 2022
畢業學年度: 110
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 82
中文關鍵詞: Attribute-based encryptionShamir secret sharingData sharingCloud environmentSecurity proof
外文關鍵詞: Attribute-based encryption, Shamir secret sharing, Data sharing, Cloud environment, Security proof
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With the emergence of many new application scenarios, secure data sharing in the system has become a critical issue. In traditional encryption, data can only be shared securely through one-to-one, but this is too slow for today's fast data-sharing environment. Therefore, an attribute-based encryption can hopefully solve this problem. In the attribute-based encryption environment, the data owner can set the access structure to share the data, which is close to the traditional access control. At the same time, the data can be shared with the users who match the access structure at one time; This effectively solves the problem of the traditional encryption where data can only be shared on a one-to-one. However, there are still some challenges in the domain of an attribute-based encryption; for example, the key generation center can generate all attribute keys, so it has ability to decrypt all ciphertexts, which leads to the risk of privacy of ciphertexts. Therefore, a key escrow protocol is proposed as a solution to the problem of an attribute-based encryption. In our protocol, the data owner can prevent the malicious behavior of the fully trusted server by the Shamir secret sharing scheme. In addition, we transfer part of the computation from the data owner to the cloud to reduce the computation cost on the data owner's device. At the same time, we provide the formal security proof to prove that our protocol is secure.


With the emergence of many new application scenarios, secure data sharing in the system has become a critical issue. In traditional encryption, data can only be shared securely through one-to-one, but this is too slow for today's fast data-sharing environment. Therefore, an attribute-based encryption can hopefully solve this problem. In the attribute-based encryption environment, the data owner can set the access structure to share the data, which is close to the traditional access control. At the same time, the data can be shared with the users who match the access structure at one time; This effectively solves the problem of the traditional encryption where data can only be shared on a one-to-one. However, there are still some challenges in the domain of an attribute-based encryption; for example, the key generation center can generate all attribute keys, so it has ability to decrypt all ciphertexts, which leads to the risk of privacy of ciphertexts. Therefore, a key escrow protocol is proposed as a solution to the problem of an attribute-based encryption. In our protocol, the data owner can prevent the malicious behavior of the fully trusted server by the Shamir secret sharing scheme. In addition, we transfer part of the computation from the data owner to the cloud to reduce the computation cost on the data owner's device. At the same time, we provide the formal security proof to prove that our protocol is secure.

Recommendation Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Approval Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x List of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 The history of attribute encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1 Lagrange polynomial interpolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Shamir secret sharing scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3 Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption . . . . . . . . 9 2.4 Bilinear map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.5 Access structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6 Linear secret sharing schemes(LSSS) . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.7 Decisional parallel bilinear diffie-hellman exponent assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.8 Security definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1 Wang et al.’s scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1 System initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1.2 New file creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1.3 New user authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1.4 Data file access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.5 Data file deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2 Varri et al.’s scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2.1 Setup phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.2.2 Keygen phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2.3 Keywordenc phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.2.4 Docencryption phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.2.5 Trapdoor phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.2.6 Search phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.2.7 Decryption phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.3 Hur’s scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.3.1 Setup phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.3.2 Key generation phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.3.3 Data encryption phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3.4 Data reencryption phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.3.5 Data decryption phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4 CCA-Secure Attribute-Based Encryption with Key Escrow Free Property in Cloud Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.1 Setup phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.2 Upload phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.3 User keygen phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.4 Download phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5 Security Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 Performance Comparison and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 6.1 Property comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 6.2 Communication comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 6.3 Computation comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 7 Implmentation and simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 7.1 Simulation environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 7.2 Simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 7.2.1 Shamir secret sharing scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 62 7.2.2 Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption . . . 63 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

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