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Author: 張振山
Chen-Shan Chang
Thesis Title: 公司治理在公司經營績效及風險間所扮演的角色
Firm Risk and Performance:The Role of Corporate Governance
Advisor: 余尚武
Shang-Wu Yu
洪政煌
Cheng-Huang Hung
Committee: 王怡心
Yi-Hsin Wang
陳明賢
Ming-Shen Chen
張琬喻
Woan-Yuh Jang
Degree: 博士
Doctor
Department: 管理學院 - 管理研究所
Graduate Institute of Management
Thesis Publication Year: 2014
Graduation Academic Year: 103
Language: 中文
Pages: 120
Keywords (in Chinese): 公司治理公司經營績效公司風險中介效果抑制效果調節效果
Keywords (in other languages): Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, Firm Risk, Mediating Effect, Suppression Effect, Moderating Effect
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  • 本研究以2008-2012年臺灣上市(櫃)公司之資料構建公司治理模型,檢驗公司治理在公司經營績效與公司風險間所扮演的角色,同時分析影響公司經營績效和風險之公司治理關鍵因子。
    實證結果發現,在全球金融風暴期間(2008-2009年)及其期後(2010-2012年)公司治理在公司經營績效和風險之間具抑制性的中介效果;同時在全球金融風暴期間,亦具有調節效果,故公司治理機制不僅可興利又可防弊,同時亦為企業風險之緩衝器。
    此外,進一步分析發現公司具有較好公司治理水準者會伴隨較高的公司績效和較低的公司風險,換言之,良好的公司治理可創造公司價值並提升公司經營績效,亦有助於控制或降低公司風險。實證結果也發現,在公司經營績效方面,股東會參與、董事長與總經理非同一人、董事會組成、董事報酬與紀律、董事專業和參與、資訊透明度、社會責任及溝通管道等七項公司治理因子與公司經營績效間呈現顯著的正向關係;在公司風險方面,股東會參與、控制股東權、董事長與總經理非同一人、董事會組成、董事專業及參與、資訊透明度等六項公司治理因子與公司風險間呈現顯著的負向關係。
    本研究不但提出建議改進先前學術研究和現存公司治理評量制度上的不足之處,並且建議構建有效的公司治理制度宜包括:股東權益、董事會職能、資訊透明度和利害關係人之權益等四個公司治理面向。同時,本研究根據實證結果建議在營運過程中,公司在強調創造經營價值之時,也應同時兼顧風險之管控,才能確保企業永續經營,特別就股東會參與、董事長和總經理非同一人、董事會組成、董事報酬和紀律、資訊透明度等五個公司治理因子,宜多加留意與關注。


    This study established a set of corporate governance assessment indices for ex-amining the potential intermediary role of corporate governance in the relationship between firm performance and risk, and identified the key corporate governance var-iables that could affect both firm performance and risk based on 2008-2012 Taiwan empirical evidences.
    The research results indicate that corporate governance has a suppressed mediat-ing effect on the relationship between firm performance and risk, both during and af-ter the financial crisis periods. Moreover, especially during a financial crisis period, corporate governance had a negative moderating effect on the relationship between firm performance and risk; therefore, it acted as a risk buffer to protect companies.
    The empirical results suggest that corporate governance has a positive correlation with firm performance, and opposite correlation with firm risk for listed companies in Taiwan. Among corporate governance factors, annual general meeting participation, chairperson and CEO split, BOD composition, director compensation and discipline, director education and participation, information transparency, and social responsibil-ity and communication vehicles have significantly positive influences on firm per-formance, while annual general meeting participation, controlling shareholder rights, chairperson and CEO split, BOD composition, director compensation and discipline, and information transparency have strong and negative relationships with the firm risk.
    This study provides statement to resolve the flaws of prior studies and existing corporate governance rating indices by developing a relatively comprehensive gov-ernance assessment system that incorporates shareholders’ rights, board of directors, information disclosure, and stakeholders’ rights dimensions. Moreover, this paper is to research the impact of corporate governance on both firm performance and firm risk.
    The results shed light on the effectiveness of different aspects of corporate gov-ernance in terms of firm performance and risk. The findings suggest that companies should take into account both value creation and the control of risk when reconsider-ing the operation of corporate governance, and should give particular attention to shareholder participation, chairperson and CEO split, BOD composition, director compensation and discipline, and information transparency.

    摘要 Ⅰ Abstract Ⅲ 誌謝 Ⅴ 目次 Ⅵ 圖目次 Ⅷ 表目次 Ⅸ 第一章、 緒論 1 第一節、 研究動機 1 第二節、 研究目的 3 第三節、 研究流程 4 第二章、 文獻探討與假說 5 第一節、 公司治理相關文獻研究 5 第二節、 國際主要公司治理評量系統之研究 12 第三節、 公司治理的中介效果和調節效果 25 第四節、 公司治理與公司績效、公司風險之關係 27 第三章、 研究方法與設計 30 第一節、 評量指標之設計 30 第二節、 迴歸模型之設計 39 第三節、 評量指標之計分方法 46 第四章、 實證結果與分析 51 第一節、 構建有效之公司治理評量指標 51 第二節、 公司治理與公司績效及風險之關係 69 第三節、 小結 88 第五章、 研究結論與建議 93 第一節、 研究結論 93 第二節、 研究建議 96 參考文獻 97 附錄 105

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