根據過去研究顯示發行新股會造成股價變動產生異常報酬，本研究探討發行現金增資及限制型股票對公司未來經營是否提供正面信息。研究以台灣上市櫃公司作為樣本，研究期間自2007年至2019年，以發行現金增資和限制員工權利新股為樣本取2010到2019年的資料，並分析前一年各公司財報資料以及前三年公司財報之簡單算術平均資料對後續三年績效是否提供信息。
研究透過事件研究法檢驗現金增資及限制型股票之發行日對股東財富產生影響，再使用多元線性回歸分析法，以累積異常報酬為應變數，獲利能力、公司經營績效、營收成長率、公司規模，董監事持股比例、獎酬方式及產業種類為自變數，探討當公司為了獎酬員工而發行現金增資及限制型股票時，對於公司未來營運是否提供信息。
經研究實證結果當公司發行現金增資及限制型股票的平均累積異常報酬對未來股東財富產生顯著負向影響，與過去研究結果相符，發行新股會帶來負面訊息使股價下跌。對於影響信息的因子中，公司規模與累積異常報酬呈部分顯著正相關，獎酬方式與累積異常報酬呈顯著正相關，董監事持股比例和產業類別與累積異常報酬呈顯著負相關，因此得到公司發行現金增資及限制型股票對未來經營提供負面信息，且會因為公司規模、獎酬方式、董監事持股比例和產業類別上述因素影響訊息效果。

Previous studies have pointed out that the issuance of new shares will cause abnormal returns due to changes in stock prices. This research aims to explore the issuance of follow-on offerings(FPO) and restricted stock(RS) whether provides positive information on future operation. This research takes Taiwan listed and OTC companies as a sample. During the research period from 2007 to 2019, the data from 2010 to 2019 were obtained by issuing FPO and RS as samples. Then analyzed the financial report of each company in the previous year and the last three years' data.
This research uses the event study to examine the impact of FPO and RS issuance date on future shareholder wealth and then uses the multiple linear regression analysis to take cumulative abnormal returns(CAR) as dependent variables, profitability, company operating performance, revenue growth rate, company size, boardholding ratio, incentive methods, and industry types are used as independent variables to explore whether provide information for the company's future operations.
The empirical results show that the average CAR significantly negatively impacts future shareholder wealth. Consistent with past research results, issuing new shares will bring negative news and make stock prices fall. Among the factors that affect information, company size is partially significantly positively correlated with CAR, incentive methods are significantly positively correlated with CAR, and boardholding ratio and industry types are significantly negatively correlated with CAR. Therefore, it is obtained that the company's issuance of FPO and RS provides negative information on future operations, and the effect of the information will be affected by factors such as company size, incentive method, boardholding ratio, and industry category.

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