本研究旨本研究旨在以Uniloc公司作為探討訴訟型PAE之專利訴訟行為的個案。本研究將Uniloc所有專利區分為自行申請、受讓以及涉訟專利，觀察後兩者的受讓和涉訟等時點並分析其後續之訴訟活動；利用(1) USPTO提供的檢索平台Patent Public Search與Assignment Search分別蒐集Uniloc自行申請與受讓取得之專利，(2) 再利用Stanford Law School NPE Litigation Database蒐集2000年至2022年所有Uniloc為原告之訴訟案件作為涉訟專利與審判結過的數據來源。
本研究之分析結果彙整如下：1.專利布局：透過轉讓作為主要專利來源，在電腦安全、網路安全、電子商務、資訊檢索和管理以及網路通訊等領域進行佈局。2.訴訟策略：(1) 從起訴策略來看，Uniloc有八成以上（81.7%）的起訴時點為受讓專利之後的一年內；(2) 超過四成（40.4%）Uniloc透過受讓取得的專利技術，開發者為技術領先的上市公司。Uniloc受讓取得並用來起訴的專利，近五成（49.5%）的是向Pendragon Wireless LLC取得，進一步追溯到原始專利權人，有25.4%為Philips。且約有六成（63.4%）的專利涉及訴訟時之專利年齡為16-20年；(3) Uniloc積極起訴Google、Apple、LG、Samsung和ZTE等在智慧型手機市場佔有重要地位的大型企業；(4) 被控侵權產品技術主要應用於與「3C產品」相關之資訊與通訊技術（ICT）。此外，近四成（36.5%）之涉訟專利最終抵押給Fortress，推論Uniloc應有投資者資助其大量的起訴。
Uniloc的訴訟行為，從涉及專利有效性的判斷來看，其大部分的專利都被判斷無效，案件最終亦多以撤銷訴訟或和解落幕。即便有揭露損害賠償金額的評決（verdict），經對方上訴後Uniloc最終與其私下和解，因此，其勝訴所獲得之損害賠償金額仍無法得知。而針對大型企業的重複起訴以及其審判結果的勝敗懸殊，推論Uniloc以索取授權金或和解金為其目的；(2) 將專利抵押給Fortress為Uniloc籌措資金的策略，以支持其對Google、Apple Inc.、LG等科技大廠的大量訴訟。此外，Uniloc曾獲得大型企業須對其支付高額損害賠償的評決，無疑已經向相關產業的業者展示其一定程度的技術與資本實力而產生示眾效果。3. 審判結果：在Uniloc提起之598件訴訟中，主要爭點為可專利性和專利有效性共計23件，其中僅3件被法院認為具有專利適格性或非顯而易見性。法院判斷Uniloc用以起訴的計算機相關技術（G06）均不符合專利適格性，電子通訊技術（H04）相關專利則大部分缺乏非顯而易見性。此外，其曾獲得2件高額損害賠償之評決。

The purpose of this study is to explore the litigation behavior of Uniloc, a patent assertion entity (PAE). To observe the timing of acquisitions and litigations to analyze subsequent litigation activities, the study divided Uniloc’s patents into original-owned (Unilic as applicant), acquired, and litigated patents. The study collects original-owned and acquired patents using the Patent Public Search and Assignment Search provided by the USPTO, and collects litigated patents and trials and decisions from the Stanford Law School NPE Litigation Database covering the past two decades (2000 to 2022).
Our findings show that: 1. patent portfolio: Based on the technology areas and acquisition of all of Uniloc's patents, inferring that the company will rely mainly on acquiring patents for its patent portfolio, and will focus on technology fields such as computer security, network security, e-commerce, information retrieval and management, and network communication. 2. litigation behavior: (1) Most of Uniloc's patents have been judged invalid, and the majority of cases have ended with the withdrawal of lawsuits or settlements. Even if the damages awarded by juries are disclosed, Uniloc settles privately with the defendant after an appeal, making it difficult to determine the final settlement amount it has obtained. Regarding repeated lawsuits against large enterprises and that Uniloc “lost” most of its lawsuits in trials and decisions, it is inferred that Uniloc's goal is to obtain licensing fees. (2) Uniloc's strategy of using patents as collateral for funding from Fortress to support its mass lawsuits against Tech Giants such as Google, Apple Inc., and LG, combined with its receipt of high damage awards from large enterprises, has certainly demonstrated its technical and capital strength to related industry players and had a demonstrative effect.3. Trial outcomes: Of the 598 lawsuits filed by Uniloc, only 23 involved patent eligibility and validity, of which only 3 were patent-eligible or non-obvious. The court found that Uniloc's computing, calculating, or counting (G06) did not meet patent eligibility, and most of its electronic communication technic (H04) patents are not non-obviousness. In addition, Uniloc has obtained two high-damage awards.

一、外文文獻
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