This research examines the association among the forms of firm control, characteristics and bribery, and also discusses the moderating effects of firm size and firm age. Base on the agency theory to investigate the relationship between the forms of firm control (manager-controlled & shareholder-controlled) and bribery. The characteristics of firm (firm size & firm age) are used to be moderators. The data set from WBES, which were analyzed by hierarchical regression. WBES contains 519 firms from Russia. Results indicate substantial support for manager-controlled firms, has positive significant associated with bribery, and firm size and firm age have negative significant associated with bribery. This research offers insights that are salient to the intention of bribery drives by decision makers and characteristics of firm.

This research examines the association among the forms of firm control, characteristics and bribery, and also discusses the moderating effects of firm size and firm age. Base on the agency theory to investigate the relationship between the forms of firm control (manager-controlled & shareholder-controlled) and bribery. The characteristics of firm (firm size & firm age) are used to be moderators. The data set from WBES, which were analyzed by hierarchical regression. WBES contains 519 firms from Russia. Results indicate substantial support for manager-controlled firms, has positive significant associated with bribery, and firm size and firm age have negative significant associated with bribery. This research offers insights that are salient to the intention of bribery drives by decision makers and characteristics of firm.

Alcorn, P. B. (1982). “Success and survival in the family-owned business”, New York:
McGraw Hill.
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1997), The White Paper, Wiley, Austun.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). “The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Baumer, E. P. (2007). “Untangling research puzzles in Merton’s multilevel anomie theory”, Theoretical Criminology, 11 (1), 63-93. doi: 10.117/1362480607072736
Baucus, M. S., & Near, J. P. (1991). “Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event history analysis”, Academy of Management Journal, 34, 9-36.
Baucus, M. S. (1994). “Pressure, opportunity and predisposition: A multivariate model of corporate illegality”, Journal of Management, 20(4), 699-721.
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). “The modern corporation and private property”, New York: Macmillan.
Bishara N. D., & Schipani C. A. (2009). “Strengthening the Ties that Bind: Preventing Corruption in the Executive Suite”, Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 765-780. doi: 10.1007/ s10551-009-0325-4.
Carmichael, S. (1995). “Business Ethics: The New Bottom Line”, Demos: Londom.
Chandler, J. D., & Graham, J. L. (2010). “Relationship-oriented cultures, corruption, and international marketing success”, Journal of Business Ethics, 95, 251-267. doi: 10.1007/s10551-009-0152-7.
Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983). Applied multiple regression/ correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd edition). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cohen, M. A. (1992). “Environmental crime and punishment: Legal/economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmental status”, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 82, 1054-1108.
Collons, J. D., Uhlenbruck, K., & Rodriguez P. (2009). “Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective”, Journal of Business Ethics, 87, 89-108. doi: 10.1007/s10551-008-9872-3.
Dabub, A.J., Rasheed, A. M. A., Priem, R. L., & Gray, D. A. (1995). “Top management team characteristics and corporate illegal activity”, Academy of Management Review, 20, 138-170.
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review 1997, Vol. 22, No. 1, 20-47.
DiMaggio, P. J., & W. W. Powell (1983), ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: institutional insomorphism and collective rationality in organizational Fields’, American Sociological review, 48, 147-160. doi: 10.2307/2095101.
Eisenhardt, M. K., (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.
Finney, H. C., and Lesieur, H. R. (1982). A contingency theory of organizational crime, In S.B. Bacharack (Ed.), Research in the sociology of organizations, Vol.1, 255-299. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Flamholtz, E. G. (1986). How to make the transition from a transitionally managed firm. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Fisman, R., & E. Miguel (2007). “Corruption, Norms and legal enforcement: evidence from diplomatic parking tickets”, The Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 1020-1049. doi: 10.1086/527495
Fisman, R., Svensson, J. (2007). “Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence”, Journal of Development Economics, 83, 63-75.
Fontrodona, J., & Sison, A. J. (2006). “The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: A Critique form Philosophical Anthropology”, Journal of Business Ethics, 66, 33-42. doi: 10.1007/s10551-006-9052-2.
Hay, G. A., and Kelly, D. (1974). “An empirical survey of price-fixing conspiracies”, Journal of Law and Economics, 13, 13-38.
Hall, R. H. (1987). Organizations: Structures, processes, and outcomes (4th ed.),
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Hitt, M. A., & J. D. (2007). Collins, “Business ethics, strategic decision making and
firm performance”, Business Horizons, 50(5), 353-357. doi: 10.1016/
j.bushor.2007.04.004.
Husted, B. W. Wealth (1999). “culture and corruption”, Journal of International Business Studies, 30(2), 339-359. dot: 10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490073.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
Kaufmann, D., & A. Kraay (2008). Governance indicators: where are we, where should we be going?, The World Bank Research Observer.
Kaufmann, D., & Wei, S. J. (1999). Does grease money speed up the wheels of commerce?, World Bank policy research working paper, no.2254.
Kimberly, J. (1976). Organizational size and the structuralist perspective: A review, critique, and proposal, Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 571-597.
Kwok, C., & S. Tadesse (2006). “The MNC as an Agent of change for host-country institutions: FDI and Corruption”, Journal of international business studies, 37, 767-785. doi: 10.1057/ palgrave.jibs.8400228.
Lambsdorff, J. (2006). Causes and Consequences of Corruption: what do we know from a cross-section of countries?, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (Edward Elgar, New York), 8-34.
Lane, R. E. (1953). “Why businessmen violate the law”, Journal of criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science, 44, 151-165.
Martin, K. D., Cullen, J. B. Johnson, J. L. and Parboteeah, K. P. (2007). “Deciding to Bribe: a cross-level analysis of firm and home country influences on bribery activity”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.50, No6, 1401-1422.
McKendall, M. A., and Wager, J. A. (1997). “Motive, opportunity, choice, and corporate illegality”, Organization Science, 8(6), 624-647.
Noonan, J. T. (1984). Bribes, New York: Macmillan.
Nunnally, J. C. (1997). Psychometric Theory, NY: McGraw-Hill Inc.
OECD Observer (2000). The Flight Against Bribery and Corruption.
Rodriguez, P., D. Siegel, A. Hillman and L. Eden (2006). “Three Lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: Politics, Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 733-746. doi: 10.1057/ palgrave.jibs.8400229.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). “Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences and Reform”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
Ross S. (1973). “The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem”, American
economics Review, 63(2), 134-139.
Sanyal R. (2005). “Determinants of bribery in international business: the cultural and economic factors”, Journal of Business Ethics, 59, 139-145.
Shleifer, A. and Summers, L. (1988). Breach of trust in hostile takeovers. In A. Auerbach, (Ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and consequence, 33-56, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Simpson, S. S. (1986). “The decomposition of antitrust: Testing a multi-level. Longitudinal model of profit-squeeze”, American Sociological Review, 51, 859-875.
Stano, M. (1976). “Monopoly power, ownership control and corporate performance”, Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 672-679.
Sullivan, J. D. (1999). Bribery and corruption in the OSCE region, hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Sixth Congress, first session, CSCE, 106-1-10.
U.S. Department of Commerce (2003). Survey of current business, Washington, DC.
Walzer, M. (1997). The Fraud. The New Republic 217, 27.
Vaughan, D. (1983). “Controlling unlawful organizational behavior: Social structure and corporate misconduct”, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Wei, S.-J. (2000). “How taxing is corruption on international business?”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 82(4), 1-12.
Wu, X. (2005). “Corporate governance and corruption: A cross-country analysis”, Goverance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 18, 151-170.
Yeager, P. (1986). Analyzing corporate offenses: Progress and prospects, In J. E. Post (E.d.), Research in corporate social performance and policy, 93-120. Greenwich, C.
Zahra, S. A., R. L. Priem and A. A. Rasheed (2005). “The Antecedents and Consequences of Top Management Fraud”, Journal of Management, 31, 803-828. doi: 10.1177/0149206305279598.
Zucker, L. G. (1987). “Institutional Theories of Organization”, Annual Review of Sociology 13, 443-467. doi: 10.1146/annurev.so.13.080187.002303.