本研究以2015至2019年我國上市櫃公司為樣本，探討審計委員會、公司治理與董監事及重要職員責任保險保額之關聯性。實證結果發現：(1) 審計委員會之設立與規模會提高董監事責任保險投保金額；(2) 公司治理與董監事責任保險投保金額呈正相關，且其增加投保金額隨其等級而增加。於增額測試發現: (3) 當公司治理達樣本平均值時，有設立審計委員會之企業將提高投保董監事責任保險保額，並減少投保不足額之情況。

Using data of Taiwan-listed companies collected from 2016 to 2019, we explored the relationship between the audit committee, corporate governance, and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) coverage.
The empirical results showed that: (1) Both the establishment and size of audit committee would increase D&O insurance coverage. (2) Corporate governance was positively correlated with D&O insurance coverage and the amount increased with its intensity. Furthermore, the results in additional test showed that: (3) When the variable of corporate governance reached to its sample mean, companies with audit committee would increase D&O insurance coverage and reduce the situation of insufficient D&O insurance coverage.

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