保固維修是企業保持競爭力的重要因素，它既是公司對產品性能的保證和承諾，也是影響消費者購買決策的重要因素。保修服務可以分為原廠維修或者委託外包，由於製造商無法直接監控服務代理商且雙方目標不同，所以外包時容易產生詐欺問題，導致公司的保修成本大幅提升，因此保修詐欺已成為保修管理的嚴重議題。
保修供應商為降低保修詐欺發生的可能性，會制定懲罰與審查機制以進行管理。本研究使用賽局理論探討服務代理商與保修供應商之間的保修詐欺問題，在賽局中，服務代理商在決定申報費用時會考量懲罰率，並且在獲得額外利益與被審查到欺騙行為時所付出的代價之間做權衡，而保修供應商也會根據服務代理商的申報費用以及審查成本來決定審查機率的分配。本研究建構二個賽局模型並求其均衡解，基本模型中假設所有的服務代理商均有動機透過保修詐欺來獲取額外的財務利益，擴展模型則加入誠實的服務代理商，以瞭解存在誠實服務代理商時對於保修供應商與服務代理商雙方互動的衝擊，並透過比較靜態分析與數值分析探討外生變數對於雙方決策的影響。本研究所推導的均衡解可提供保修供應商與服務代理商制定合約時之參考依據，保修供應商也能預期調整預算和審查計劃時，服務代理商行為的改變。

關鍵字：保修詐欺、賽局理論、保修供應商、服務代理商、保修

The warranty that can signify a company’s commitment to the performance of products has become one of the key elements in the consumer purchase decision-making process. Warranty management thus becomes a critical business function. However, when a warranty provider outsources the service to external service agents, service agents might conduct fraudulent activities to obtain extra financial benefits, because two parties have different interests and asymmetric information. For reducing the adverse effect of warranty frauds, this study formulates a game-theoretical model to design mechanisms (including punishment and audit schedule) for warranty management. In particular, the service agent will make a decision on billing price after considering the penalty and audit schedule announced by the warranty provider. Two models were constructed and solved for equilibrium in this study. The basic model assumes that all the service agents have the motivation to conduct fraudulent activities. The extended model assumes that there are some honest service agents existed. Sensitivity and numerical analyses were also conducted to investigate the effects of different exogenous variables on the equilibrium. The results of this study could help developing appropriate guidelines for planning a warranty fraud reduction initiative and for addressing implementation challenges.

Keywords: Warranty Fraud, Game Theory, Warranty Provider, Service Agent, Warranty

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