研究生: |
劉義郎 I-lang Liu |
---|---|
論文名稱: |
任務互依性的績效獎勵制度設計 The Incentive Schemes of Interdependence |
指導教授: |
林維熊
Wei-Shong Lin |
口試委員: |
張順教
none 陳崇文 none |
學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 企業管理系 Department of Business Administration |
論文出版年: | 2010 |
畢業學年度: | 98 |
語文別: | 中文 |
論文頁數: | 68 |
中文關鍵詞: | 任務互依性 、誘因強度 、代理成本 、隱性契約與聲譽關注 、團體績效 、過程指標 、負面的激勵制度 |
外文關鍵詞: | Task Interdependence, Incentive-intensity principle, Agency cost, Implicit Contract and Reputational Concerns, Team performance, Process indicator, Negative incentive |
相關次數: | 點閱:378 下載:0 |
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團隊工作模式已成企業組織主要運作模式。但是,如何設計一個與團隊運作相互搭配之管理制度,學術界仍缺乏相關之研究。根據誘因強度準則(Incentive-intensity principle),本研究探討任務互依性及任務產出能否客觀的量化,如何影響績效獎勵制度的設計,特別是這些任務特徵如何影響團隊績效及個人績效的相對權重。
Team work has been the main organizational form in business world. However, there is little research works that aim at what performance evaluation could match this team organizational form. Our research explores how the characteristics of tasks af-fect the performance evaluation system. Specifically, we are interested in how the task interdependence and output measurability affect the relative weights between group and individual measures.
英文文獻
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中文文獻
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