部分代理人理論(Agency Theory)文獻認為，增加高階經理人(TMT)的持股比例會讓高階經理人趨於保守，而另一部分文獻卻認為如此會讓TMT趨於冒險，目前關於TMT持股比例與其冒險行為之間的關係在文獻上仍尚無定論。另外，目前也少有文獻試圖透過企業行為理論(A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, BTOF)的觀點來探討高階經理人持股比例與其冒險行為的相關性，但卻有越來越多學者嘗試將企業期望(firm aspiration)的因素納入考量。綜觀上述的文獻發展現況，加上台灣半導體產業蒸蒸日上，在全球具有領導地位，本論文嘗試透過企業行為理論與企業期望之觀點，探討台灣半導體企業TMT持股比例與企業冒險行為之相關性。

本論文自台灣新報資料庫(TEJ) 擷取十年期（西元2010-2020）歸類於「上市企業」、「半導體產業」之企業資料，透過一般線性迴歸分析(OLS regression) 進行研究假說驗證。從實證結果發現，首先，台灣半導體企業在不考量企業期望的情況下，高階經理人持股比例越高，企業會越不傾向深耕式(exploitation)投資；而當台灣半導體企業在其營收表現越高於企業期望時，企業會越趨保守，越不傾向投資冒險，而且探索式(exploration)投資比深耕式投資更不受青睞。其次，對於企業冒險行為的影響性來說，企業當前營收表現與自身過去績效的比較(historical comparison)會比與產業同業間的比較(social comparison)的效果來得大。最後，本論文發現，當台灣半導體企業表現佳，且企業又提高高階經理人的持股比例時，企業會更傾向採取冒險行為，背後原因推論是由於高階經理人自負(Hubris)現象所導致。

總結，本論文的研究發現不僅為企業界在實務上提供如何影響高階經理人行為的參考建議，同時在學術文獻上也透過納入企業行為理論觀點進而補強了代理人理論在關於經理人行為誘因設計上偏於風險趨避的論點。

Some research of Agency Theory(AT) states that increasing the shareholdings of top management team(TMT) will cause TMT risk-averse. However, some of the research states that increasing the shareholdings of top management team will make top management team more risk-taking. Nowadays, the researchers still don’t have a final conclusion. Besides, in the past, there are few research of AT try to consider the aspect of A Behavior Theory of the Firm (BTOF) to discuss the relationship between the shareholdings of TMT and the risk-taking behavior of the firms. Recently, there are more and more researchers considering the aspiration of the firms when discussing about Agency problems because the aspiration will also influence the personal decision model. The booming semi-conductor industry in Taiwan is leading the world now. As a result, our research collecting financial data of listed semi-conductor companies from TEJ to discuss the relationship between the shareholdings of TMT and the risk-taking behavior of the semi-conductor firms in Taiwan. Our research not only provides some suggestions for the firms, but also compensates the gap of academia, which we apply BTOF to AT in Taiwanese semi-conductor industry.

We analyzed the data by OLS regression. Our research shows the results below: When increasing the shareholdings of TMT, TMT will decrease the investment in exploitation; For Taiwanese semi-conductor firms, higher aspiration results in higher risk-averse, and compared to the investment in exploitation, the investment in exploration will be less; Historical comparison influenced more than social comparison; When the firms perform well, and we also increase the shareholdings of TMT at the same time, TMT will dominate and take risk, which we also called it ” TMT Hubris”.

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