簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 陳香蘭
Hsiang-Lan Chen
論文名稱: Employee Stock Bonus, R&D Expenditures and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan’s Information-Technology Industry
Employee Stock Bonus, R&D Expenditures and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan’s Information-Technology Industry
指導教授: 黃彥聖
Yen-Sheng Huang
口試委員: 劉代洋
Day-Yang Liu
張琬喻
Woan Yuh Jang
學位類別: 博士
Doctor
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 企業管理系
Department of Business Administration
論文出版年: 2006
畢業學年度: 94
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 91
中文關鍵詞: 公司績效研發支出代理問題員工分紅入股
外文關鍵詞: D expenditures, firm performance, agency theory, employee stock bonus
相關次數: 點閱:256下載:0
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報

本研究的三大主旨為:(1)釐清員工分紅入股對公司績效的關係,(2)瞭解員工分紅入股對公司決策(如:研發支出)的影響,(3)探討研發支出對員工分紅入股與公司績效關係的干擾效果。
以台灣上市資訊電子業為例子,研究結果顯示員工分紅入股對公司績效與研支出皆存在正向相關。再者,研發支出會加強員工分紅入股對公司績效的影響。這些實證結果表示員工分紅入股能促使經理人與員工和公司股東的利益趨於一致。經理人在面臨決策時,會以增加股東財富為依歸,譬如進行較多的研發投資案等。員工分紅入股亦會激勵員工投入更多的心力於研發創新活動中,以及更願意自動的分享他們的專業知識與解決問題。如此,研發投資活動的風險降低,進而促進研發創新活動的成功。因為研發投資活動的成功,公司績效因而提升。


The three objectives in this paper are (1) to clarify whether employee stock bonus could enhance or hamper firm performance, (2) to examine the stock bonus effect on corporate decision regarding R&D expenditures, and (3) to investigate whether R&D expenditures strengthen or weaken the relationship between stock bonus and firm performance.
Using a sample of Taiwan listed information-technology firms over the sample period 1996-2001, the empirical results document a positive association between employee stock bonus and firm performance. Additionally, it is evident that R&D expenditures are positive and significant related to employee stock bonus. Moreover, the interaction of stock bonus and R&D expenditures is significantly positive.
The evidences are consistent with the argument that employee stock bonus is an interest-alignment mechanism for enhancing firm performance. Employee stock bonus could (1) promote managers to take risky R&D projects that may maximize shareholder wealth; and (2) motivate employees to work hard in innovative activities, and to share their private knowledge and solve problems voluntarily. As R&D risks decreases and the likelihood of R&D success increases, firms are more likely to make sizable R&D investments that further lead to enhanced firm performance.

Chinese Abstract……………………………………………………………………...Ⅰ English Abstract……………………………………………………………………...Ⅱ Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………Ⅲ List of Figures …………………………………………………………….…………Ⅵ List of Tables……………………………………………………………………….. Ⅶ 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1 2. Background………………………………………………………………………..7 2.1 Employee Compensation in Taiwan………………………………………...7 2.2 Employee Stock Bonus in Taiwan versus U.S. ESOPs……………………..8 2.3 Taiwan’s IT Industry and Employee Stock Bonus………………………….9 3. Theory, Literature and Hypotheses………………………………………………17 3.1 Equity-Based Compensation and Firm Performance……………………...17 3.1.1 Equity-Based Compensation…………………………………………17 3.1.2 Employee Stock Bonus………………………………………………19 3.2 Equity-Based Compensation and R&D Expenditures…………………….21 3.2.1 Agency Problems in R&D…………………………………………....21 3.2.1.1 Goal Divergence and Risk Differential between Managers and Shareholders…………………………………………………21 3.2.1.2 Hidden Information and Actions Confronted by Employers……..23 3.2.2 Equity-Based Compensation and Agency Problems…………………24 3.2.2.1 Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Decision in R&D Expenditures..……………………………………………...24 3.2.2.2 Equity-Based Compensation and Employee Behavior…………..25 3.3 R&D Expenditures and the Relationship between Employee Stock Bonus and Firm Performance………………………………………….…..28 3.4 Research Framework………………………………………………………29 4. Sample, Variables and Methodology……………………………………………..31 4.1 Data………………………………………………………………………..31 4.2 Measurement of Variables…………………………………………………36 4.2.1 Dependent Variables………………………………………………….36 4.2.2 Independent Variables………………………………………………..36 4.2.3 Control Variables……………………………………………………..37 4.3 Methodology………………………………………………………………38 4.3.1 Preliminary Tests……………………………………………………..38 4.3.2 Regression Equations………………………………………………...39 5. Empirical Results………………………………………………………………...44 5.1 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………44 5.2 The Relationship between Employee Stock Bonus and Firm Performance……………………………………………………………….46 5.3 The Relationship between Employee Stock Bonus and R&D Expenditures……………………………………………………………….55 5.4 R&D Expenditures and the Relationship between Employee Stock Bonus and Firm Performance……………………………………………...61 6. Summary and Conclusion………………………………………………………..66 7. Managerial and Theoretical Implication…………………………………………69 8. Research Limitations……………………………………………………………..72 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………..73 References……………………………………………………………………………74 About the Author……………………………………………………………………..81

Aboody, D., 1996, Market valuation of employee stock options, Journal of
Accounting and Economics 22, 357-391.
Agrawal, A. and G. N. Mandelker, 1987, Managerial incentives and corporate
investment and financing decisions, Journal of Finance 42, 823-837.
Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, Production, information costs and economic organization, American Economic Review 62, 777-795.
Ang, J. S., A. S. Chen and J. W. Lin, 2005, Ascertaining the effects of employee bonus plans, Applied Economics 37, 1439-1448.
Baber, W., S. Janakiraman and S. Kang, 1996, Investment opportunities and the
structure of executive compensation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 21,
297-318.
Bah, R. and P. Dumontier, 2001, R&D intensity and corporate financial policy: Some international evidence, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 28, 672-692.
Balkin, D. B., G. D. Markman and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 2000, Is CEO pay in
high-technology firms related to innovation?, Academy of Management Journal
43, 1118-1129.
Balkin, D. B. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 1984, Determinants of R and D compensation strategies in the high tech industry, Personnel Psychology 37, 635-650.
Barker III, V. L. and G. C. Mueller, 2002, CEO characteristics and firm R&D
spending, Management Science 48, 782-801.
Baysinger, B. D. and R. E. Hoskisson, 1989, Diversification strategy and R&D ratio in multiproduct firms, Academy of Management Journal 32, 310-332.
Baysinger, B. D., R. D. Kosnik and T. A. Turk, 1991, Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy, Academy of Management Journal 34,205-214.
Becker, B. E. and C. A. Olson, 1989, Unionization and shareholder interests,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 42, 246-261.
Bhagat, S. and I. Welch, 1995, Corporate research & development investments,
international comparisons, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 443-470.
Blasi, J., M. Conte and D. Kruse, 1996, Employee stock ownership and corporate
performance among public companies, Industrial and Labor Relations Review
50, 60-79.
Chang, S., 1990, Employee stock ownership plans and shareholder wealth: An
empirical investigation, Financial Management 19, 48-58.
Chen, C. Y., 2003, Investment opportunities and the relation between equity value and employees’ bonus, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 30, 941-973.
Defeo, V. J., R.A. Lambert and D. F. Larcker, 1989, The executive compensation
effects of equity-for-debt swaps, Accounting Review 64, 201-227.
DeFusco, R. A. and T. S. Zorn, 1991, The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making, Financial Management 20, 36-43.
Demsetz, H., 1973, Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy, Journal of Law and Economics 16, 1-9.
Dhillon, U. and G. Ramirez, 1994, Employee stock ownership and corporate control: An empirical study, Journal of Banking and Finance 18, 9-26.
Ducy, M., Z. Iqbal and A. Akhigbe, 1997, Employee stock ownership plans and cash flow performance of publicly traded firms, American Business Review 15,
31-36.
Fama, E. F. and M. L. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
Fisher, F. M. and J. J. McGowan, 1983, On the misuse of accounting rates of return to infer monopoly profits, American Economic Review 73, 82-97.
Frye, M. B., 2004, Equity-based compensation for employee: Firm performance and determinants, Journal of Financial Research 27, 31-54.
Gaver, J. and K. Gaver, 1993, Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation
policies, Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 125-160.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., D. B. Balkin and G. T. Milkovich, 1990, Rethinking rewards for technical employees, Organizational Dynamics 18, 62-75.
Gordon, L. A. and J. Pound, 1989, ESOPs and Corporate Control, Journal of Employee Ownership Law and Finance 1, 63-73.
Gordon, L. A. and J. Pound, 1990, ESOPs and Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 525-555.
Graves, S. B. and N. S. Langowitz, 1993, Innovative productivity and returns to scale in the pharmaceutical industry, Strategic Management Journal 14, 593-605.
Guay, W. R., 1999, The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and determinants, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 43-71.
Hamel, G. and C. K. Prahalad, 1994, Competing for the future, Harvard Business
Review 72, 122-128.
Han, T. S., 2003, The economic effects of profit sharing and Taiwan-style employee stock ownership plans: Evidence from Taiwan’s high-tech firms, Taiwan
Academy of Management Journal 3, 1-22.
Hartzell, J. C. and L. T. Starks, 2003, Institutional investors and executive
Compensation, Journal of Finance 58, 2351-2374.
Hoskisson, R. E., M. A. Hitt and C. W. Hill, 1993, Managerial incentives and
investment in R&D in large multiproduct firms, Organization Science 4,
325-341.
Huselid, M. A., 1995, The impact of human resource management practices on
turnover, productivity, and corporate financial performance, Academy of
Management Journal 38, 635-672.
Iqbal, Z. and S. A. Hamid, 2000, Stock price and operating performance of ESOP
firms: A time-series analysis, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 39,
25-47.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,agency costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jensen, G. R., D. P. Solberg and T. S. Zorn, 1992, Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, debt, and dividend policies, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 27, 247-263.
Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback, 1983, The market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50.
Jeongchul, H., 2000, Executive compensation and firm performance: Domestic and
multinational firms, Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 1-118.
Klein, K. J., 1987, Employee stock ownership and employee attitudes: A test of three models, Journal of Applied Psychology Monograph 72, 319-332.
Larcker, D. F., 1983, The association between performance plan adoption and
corporate capital investment, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 3-30.
Lee, P. M. and H. M. O’Neill, 2003, Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S. and Japanese firms: Agency and stewardship perspectives, Academy of
Management Journal 46, 212-225.
Lee, M. B. and Y. Rhee, 1996, Bonuses, unions, and labor productivity in South
Korea, Journal of Labor Research 17, 219-238.
Lee, S. H., P. K. Wong and C. L. Chong, 2005, Human and social capital explanations or R&D outcomes, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 52, 59-58.
Livingston, T. D. and J. B. Henry, 1980, The effect of employee ownership on
corporate profits, Journal of Risk and Insurance 47, 491-505.
Mehran, H., 1995, Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm
performance, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
Myers, SC and MS Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221.
Nam, J., R. E. Ottoo and J. H. Thornton, Jr., 2003, The effect of managerial incentives to bear risk on corporate capital structure and R&D investment, The Financial Review 38, 77-101.
Park, S. and M. H. Song, 1995, Employee stock ownership plans, firm performance, and monitoring by outside blockholders, Financial Management 24, 52-65.
Paul, J. M., 1992, On the efficiency of stock-based compensation, Review of
Financial Studies 5, 471-502.
Pierce, J. L., S. A. Rubenfeld and S. Morgan, 1991, Employee ownership: A
conceptual model of process and effects, Academy of Management Reviews 16,
121-144.
Pugh, W. N., J. S. Jahera Jr. and S. L. Oswald, 1999, ESOPs, takeover protection, and corporate decision-making, Journal of Economics and Finance 23, 170-185.
Pugh, W. N., S. L. Oswald and J. S. Jahera, Jr., 2000, The effect of ESOP adoptions on corporate performance: Are there really performance change, Managerial and Decision Economics 21, 167-180.
Raz, T., A. J. Shenhar and D. Dvir, 2002, Risk management, project success, and technological uncertainty, R&D Management 32, 101-109.
Rosen, C. and M. Quarrey, 1987, How well is employee ownership working?, Harvard Business Review 65, 126-129.
Ryan, Jr. H. E. and R. A. Wiggins, 2002, The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy, Financial Management 31, 5-29.
Schilling, M. A. and C. W. L. Hill, 1998, Managing the new product development
process: Strategic imperatives, Academy of Management Executives 12, 67-75.
Scholes, M. S., 1991, Stock and compensation, Journal of Finance 46, 803-823.
Smith, C. W., H. Lazarus and H. M. Kalkstein, 1990, Employee stock ownership
plans: Motivation and morale issues, Compensation and Benefits Review 22,
37-46.
Smith, C. and R. Stulz, 1985, The determinants of firm’s hedging policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 391-405.
Smith, C. W. and R. L. Watts, 1992, The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies, Journal of Financial Economics
32, 263-292.
Tosi, H. L. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 1994, CEO monitoring: A behavioral approach, Academy of Management Journal 37, 1002-1016.
Tsai, K. H. and J. C. Wang, 2004, The R&D performance in Taiwan’s electronics
industry: A longitudinal examination, R&D Management 34, 179-189.
Wagner, I. and C. Rosen, 1985, Employee ownership - Its effects on corporate performance, Employee Relations Today 12, 73-79.
Welbourne, T. M., D. B. Balkin and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 1995, Gainsharing and
mutual monitoring: A combined agency-organizational justice interpretation,
Academy of Management Journal 38, 881-899.
Welbourne, T. M. and L. A. Cyr, 1999, Using ownership as an incentive: Does the“too many chiefs” rule apply in entrepreneurial firms?, Group & Organizational Management 24, 438-460.
Wiseman, R. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 1998, A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking, Academy of Management Journal 23, 133-153.
Yao, S., 1997, Profit sharing, bonus payment, and productivity: A case study of Chinese state-owned enterprises, Journal of Comparative Economics 24,
281-296.
Zenger, T., 1994, Explaining organizational diseconomies of scale in R&D: Agency problems and the allocation of engineering talent, ideas, and effort by firm size,Management Science 40, 708-729.
Zingales, L., 2000, In search of new foundation, Journal of Finance 55, 1623-1653.

無法下載圖示 全文公開日期 2011/05/19 (校內網路)
全文公開日期 本全文未授權公開 (校外網路)
全文公開日期 本全文未授權公開 (國家圖書館:臺灣博碩士論文系統)
QR CODE