本研究以台灣上市公司為樣本，使用二階段最小平方法 (2SLS, two stage least square)比較國內機構投資法人對家族及非家族企業績效之影響。另外，本研究進一步檢視企業資訊揭露程度對家族與非家族企業績效之影響。
根據本研究實證結果發現，將TOBIN'S Q做為衡量績效的標準，台灣家族企業績效顯著低於非家族企業。機構法人中，國內金融機構法人持股對家族企業績效(TOBIN'S Q)呈正相關，對非家族企業(ROA(EBDIT))呈負相關。外資法人部分，其持股對家族企業績效(ROA(EBDIT))呈正相關。國內政府機構法人部分，不論家族或非家族企業，皆對其企業績效呈負向相關。在國內信託基金法人部分，只對家族企業產生影響，其持股對(ROA(EBDIT))呈正相關，TOBIN'S Q呈負相關。最後，在國內公司機構法人部分，對家族企業績效TOBIN'S Q呈負相關。非家族企業部分，則呈現對會計績效ROA(EBDIT)呈負相關，與市值績效TOBIN'S Q呈正相關。最後，資訊揭露程度對台灣家族企業績效TOBIN'S Q呈負相關，對非家族企業績效TOBIN'S Q呈正相關。

This study used the Taiwanese listed companies to examine the influence of institutional ownership on family and non-family business performances by two stage least square. Moreover, we also examine the effect of information transparency on family and non-family business performances.
When the market value performance (Tobin’s Q) indicators are applied, the empirical results show that family business have worse performance. Our empirical results also indicate that financial institution ownership positively affect family business performance (TOBIN'S Q), but financial institution ownership negatively affect non-family business performance (ROA (EBDIT)). Foreign ownership has positively influence on family business performance (ROA (EBDIT)). Government ownership has negative correlation with business performance. Trust fund ownership has positively influence on family business performance (ROA (EBDIT)) and has negatively influence on family business performance (TOBIN'S Q). Domestic institution ownership is negatively related to family business performance (TOBIN'S Q). It is also negatively related to non-family business performance (ROA (EBDIT)), but positively related to non-family business performance (TOBIN'S Q). Information transparency negatively affect family business performance (TOBIN'S Q), and positively affect non-family business performance (TOBIN'S Q).

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