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研究生: 陳宥潤
You-Run Chen
論文名稱: 支援 O-RAN 的惡意及異常 xAPP 檢測器
O-RAN-Enabled Malicious and Anomalous xAPP Detector
指導教授: 鄭欣明
Shin-Ming Cheng
口試委員: 徐瑞壕
Ruei-Hau Hsu
柯拉飛
Rafael Kaliski
王紹睿
Shao-Jui Wang
鄭欣明
Shin-Ming Cheng
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 電資學院 - 資訊工程系
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering
論文出版年: 2023
畢業學年度: 111
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 47
中文關鍵詞: 開放式無線電網路惡意 xAPP異常 xAPP惡意程式檢測O-RAN 沙盒
外文關鍵詞: O-RAN, malicious xAPP, anomalous xAPP, malware detection, O-RAN Sandbox
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  • Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) 下一代 RAN 提供了更靈活開發 與部署的開放式 RAN 架構,同時為了能更有效的管理數量龐大的基 地台及多元化的 UE 設備,O-RAN 引入了智慧控制器 Radio Intelligent Controller (RIC),開發人員將 xAPP 上傳至近即時的智慧控制器 (NearRT RIC) 透過收集位在 O-RAN 上的 O-CU 及 O-DU 節點的數據,並利 用 xAPP 上的機器學習模型來對收集到的數據進行分析並產生決策後透過 O-RAN 聯盟所制定的標準介面將決策回傳給 O-CU 及 O-DU 執行,以 對 O-RAN 節點效能及資源分配進行優化,提升 UE 端的使用品質。然 而 O-RAN 聯盟對於開發人員上傳 xAPP 至 Near-RT RIC 的流程並沒有 提供任何的檢測機制,這意味著未來開發人員能將具有惡意行為程式的 xAPP 上傳至 Near-RT RIC 上為 O-RAN 系統埋下後門,使 xAPP 可以未 經授權的對 O-CU、O-DU 或 Near-RT RIC 上的服務進行存取,這將會 對 O-RAN 架構上的安全性有很嚴重的影響。我們提出能相容於 O-RAN Software Community (O-RAN SC) 提出的 xAPP 部署流程的檢測機制。 們的檢測機制提供惡意程式檢測,並同時提供 O-RAN 沙盒環境,目標為 檢測具有惡意或異常行為的 xAPP,以提升 O-RAN 架構的安全性和可靠 性。實驗表明,我們的 xAPP 檢測器能夠有檢測出 O-RAN 架構中的惡意 和異常 xAPP。


    The Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) is a next-generation RAN architecture that provides a more flexible and open architecture for development and deployment. To effectively manage a large number of cells and heterogeneous UE, O-RAN introduces the Radio Intelligent Controller (RIC). Third-party developer can upload xAPP to the Near-RT RIC, which collects data from O-CU and O-DU nodes located in the O-RAN. Using machine learning models employed in xAPP, the collected data is analyzed, and decisions are generated. These decisions are then returned to O-CU and O-DU for execution through standard interfaces defined by the O-RAN Alliance. This optimization of O-RAN node performance and resource allocation enhances the Quality of Experience (QoE) for UE users. However, the O-RAN Alliance does not provide any detection mechanism for developers to upload xAPP to the Near Real Time (Near-RT) RIC. This means that in the future, developers could upload xAPP with malicious behavior to the Near-RT RIC, creating backdoors in the O-RAN system. This unauthorized access could allow the xAPP to access services on O-CU, O-DU, or the Near-RT RIC, which would have a serious impact on the security of the O-RAN architecture. To address this issue, we propose a detection mechanism that is compatible with the xAPP deployment process proposed by the O-RAN Software Community (O-RAN SC). Our detection mechanism provides malware detection, and the O-RAN sandbox environment aims to detect malicious and anomalous xAPP, enhancing the security and reliability of the O-RAN architecture. The experiments show that our xAPP detector can effectively identify and detect malicious and anomalous xAPP within the O-RAN architecture.

    Contents Abstract in Chinese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Abstract in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi List of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.0.1 Components and Interfaces related to xAPP in ORAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.0.2 xAPP Deployment Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.0.3 xAPP Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.0.4 xAPP Possible Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.0.5 Malicious ELF Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3 xAPP Detection Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.0.1 Static Detection for Malicious xAPP . . . . . . . . 18 3.0.2 xAPP Sandbox for Anomaly Detection . . . . . . 21 4 Experiment Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.0.1 O-RAN Experiment Environment . . . . . . . . . 25 4.0.2 Malicious xAPP Detection Based on FCG . . . . . 25 4.0.3 O-RAN Sandbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

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