我國金融監督管理委員會為推動「新版公司治理藍圖(2020)」，於2020年修訂《公開發行公司應行記載事項準則》以強化公司治理運作情形、促進董事、監察人及高階經理人酬金資訊透明化及合理化，以及提升非財務性資訊之揭露品質。
本研究首先探討此次修法能否抑制董監事薪酬發放水準，達到其立法意旨，接續探討董監事薪酬與公司治理、公司績效之關聯性，以2015年至2020年我國上市櫃公司，共8,294筆樣本，以檢視政策之有效性。
實證結果發現：(1)需個別揭露董監事酬金之上市櫃公司，於過去年度薪酬發放水準顯著高於不需揭露之公司。(2)金管會於2020年修法後，其董監事薪酬發放有呈現下降趨勢。(3)被金管會點名之上市櫃公司，提升公司治理有助於抑制董監事薪酬。(4)被金管會點名之上市櫃公司，董監事薪酬與薪酬績效敏感度為負相關。

In order to strengthen the corporate governance, facilitate the transparency and justification of the compensation information of directors, supervisors and chief executive officer, and enhance the disclosure quality of non-financial information. The Financial Supervisory Commission has given impetus to the Blueprint on Corporate Governance (2020) and amended the《Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies》.
Above all, the study explores whether the amendment can inhibit the pay-out level of directors and supervisors compensation, which is the legislative purpose. Subsequently, the study investigates the relevance between directors and supervisor compensation, corporate governance and firm performance by examining the effectiveness of the policy. The research has collected 8,294 samples, which are from the firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2020.
The empirical results showed that: (1) The level of the directors and supervisors compensation at the listed companies required to disclose the remuneration individually is significantly higher than that of the companies not under such requirement for the year from 2015 to 2019; (2) After the legislative amendment by the Financial Supervisory Commission in 2020, the payout of directors and supervisors compensation indicate a downward trend; (3) For the listed companies named by the Financial Supervisory Commission, improvement of corporate governance has helped curb the remuneration of directors and supervisors; (4) For the listed companies named by the Financial Supervisory Commission, there is a negative correlation between the directors and supervisors compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity.

參考文獻
吳建頤（1999）。董事會規模對公司價值的影響。未出版之碩士論文，國立中正大學財務金融研究所，嘉義縣。
呂學焜（2008）。公司治理與公司績效對董事酬勞影響之研究。未出版之碩士論文，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所，台北市。
宋致皓（2006）。董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究。未出版之碩士論文，國立政治大學會計研究所，台北市。
林世斌（2013）。設置薪酬委員會對董監薪酬與公司績效關聯之影響。未出版之碩士論文，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所，台北市。
林佳穎（2002）。財務危機公司特性與公司治理之探討。未出版之碩士論文，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所，台北市。
高蘭芬；邱正仁 (2002)。董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響。臺大管理論叢，13 卷1 期，127-162。
張峻萍（1999）。公司監理與經營績效之關係。未出版之碩士論文，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所，台北市。
張惠雯（2013）。薪酬委員會對於董監事薪酬與公司績效之間敏感度的影響―台灣公司之證據。未出版之碩士論文，國立成功大學會計學系碩博士班，台南市。
張瑞當、林國欽、沈文華與侯佩秀(2007)。高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響。會計與公司治理，4(1), 57-84。
許惟禎（2013）。薪酬委員會成立對董監薪酬之影響－以台灣公司為例。未出版之碩士論文，國立成功大學會計學系碩博士班，台南市。
陳在鴻（2007）。董監事酬勞與公司績效相關性之研究。未出版之碩士論文，國立中正大學財務金融所，嘉義縣。
陳明園、石雅慧(2004)。高階經理人薪酬－代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究。臺大管理論叢，15(1)，131-166。
陳清祥（2011）。設置薪酬委員會之實務議題。會計研究月刊（308），頁 62-66。
陳瑞斌與許崇源(2007)。公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究。交大管理學報，27(2)，55-109。
黃小玉 (2004)。公司治理與公司績效關係之研究－以台灣上市電子工業為例。興國學報(3)，153-167。
廖秀梅，李建然及吳祥華(2006)。董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響。東吳經濟商學學報(54)，117-160。
廖益興 (2010)。董事會組成、股權結構與年報資訊揭露水準。臺大管理論叢，20 卷2 期，209-249。
鄧穎懋、李秀玲(2012)。薪酬委員會之功能及運作模式：評析證劵交易法第14條之6。朝陽商管評論,11(1)，69-85。
Abowd, J. (1989). Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity In Social Exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299): Academic Press.
Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1987). Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. The Journal of Finance, 42(4), 823-837.
Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1990). Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments.The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(2), 143-161.
Belkaoui, A., & Karpik, P. G. (1989). Determinants of the Corporate Decision to
Disclose Social Information. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal,2(1).
Bloom, M. (1999). The performance effects of pay dispersion on individuals and
organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1), 25-40.
Boyd, B. K. (1994). Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management
Journal, 15(5), 335-344.
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2006). CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 403-423.
Cahan, S., Emanuel, D., & Sun, J. (2009). The effect of earnings quality and country level institutions on the value relevance of earnings. Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting, 33, 371-391.
Cladera, R., & Gispert, C. (2003). Total Board Compensation, Governance and Performance of Spanish Listed Companies. LABOUR, 17, 103-126.
Collins, D. W., & Kothari, S. P. (1989). An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 11(2), 143-181.
Conyon, M., Peck, S., Read, L., & Sadler, G. (2000). The Structure of Executive
Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence. Long Range Planning, 33, 478-503.
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and
Top Management Compensation. The Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 146-157.
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial
Economics, 51(3), 371-406.
Coughlan, A. T., & Schmidt, R. M. (1985). Executive compensation, management
turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 43-66.
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994). Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm: An
empirical assessment. Strategic Management Journal, 15(8), 643-654.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of
Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. The Academy of
Management Journal, 42(6), 674-686.
Debreceny, R., Gray, G. L., & Rahman, A. (2002). The determinants of Internet
financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 21(4-5), 371-394.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and Consequences of
Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1-36.
Deegan, C., & Gordon, B. (1996). A Study of the Environmental Disclosure Practices
of Australian Corporations. Accounting and Business Research,26(3), 187-199.
Diamond, D. W. (1985). Optimal Release of Information By Firms. The Journal of
Finance, 40(4), 1071-1094.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. The
Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1988). Chief executive compensation: A synthesis
and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), 543-558.
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 31(1), 405-440.
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review, 9(Apr), 7-26.
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91.
Indjejikian, R., & Nanda, D. (1999). Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(2), 177-201.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
John, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(4), 371-403.
Johnson, E. J., Hershey, J., Meszaros, J., & Kunreuther, H. (1993). Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7(1), 35-51.
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400.
Kosnik, R. D. (1987). Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(2), 163-185.
Landsberg, B. K., & Jacobs, L. G. (2007). Global issues in constitutional law.
Leung, S., Richardson, G., & Jaggi, B. (2014). Corporate board and board committee
independence, firm performance, and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong firms. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 10(1), 16-31.
Lev, B. (1992). Information Disclosure Strategy. California Management Review, 34(4), 9-32.
Lippert, R. L., & Moore, W. T. (1995). Monitoring versus Bonding: Shareholder Rights
and Management Compensation. Financial Management, 24(3), 54-62.
Mangel, R., & Singh, H. (1993). Ownership Structure, Board Relationships and CEO
Compensation in Large US Corporations. Accounting and Business Research,23(sup1), 339-350.
Meek, G. K., Roberts, C. B., & Gray, S. J. (1995). Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European Multinational
Corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3), 555-572.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,20, 293-315.
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal
of Financial Economics, 20, 237-265.
Rich, J. T., & Larson, J. A. (1984). Why Some Long-Term Incentives Fail.Compensation Review, 16(1), 26-37.
Ryan, H. E., & Wiggins, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation,
board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial
Economics, 73(3), 497-524.
Saudagaran, S. M., & Diga, J. G. (1997). Accounting Regulation in ASEAN: A Choice
between the Global and Regional Paradigms of Harmonization. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 8(1), 1-32.
Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting Review, 73(4), 459-474.
Sharma, P. (2004). An Overview of the Field of Family Business Studies: Current Status and Directions for the Future. Family Business Review, 17(1), 1-36.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.
Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in
Organizations. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2(2), 181-214.
Vafeas, N. (2000). Board structure and the informativeness of earnings. Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, 19(2), 139-160.
Vafeas, N., & Afxentiou, Z. (1998). The association between the SEC's 1992
compensation disclosure rule and executive compensation policy changes. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 17(1), 27-54.
Waterman, R., & Meier, K. (1998). Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? Journal
of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8.
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive accounting theory.
Weir, C., & Laing, D. (2001). Governance Structures, Director Independence and
Corporate Performance in the UK. European Business Review, 13, 86-95.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of
directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.
Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside
Directors. The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2281-2308.
Zhu, W., Avolio, B., & Walumbwa, F. (2009). Moderating Role of Follower Characteristics With Transformational Leadership and Follower Work Engagement. Group & Organization Management - GROUP ORGAN MANAGE, 34, 590-619.