國內退休基金資產規模持續成長，為結合民間資源，增加投資效益，委外經營比重亦逐年成長，除事前訂定嚴謹的遴選機制外，亦需建構一套完整架構之監管機制，以確保資產安全。故本研究以公務人員退休撫卹基金委外監管機制為研究主題，採用組織生命週期理論為核心架構，將退撫基金委託契約生命週期分為初始階段、過程階段與評估階段，分析各階段主要管理策略，透過個案研究法與深度訪談彙整結果，顯現及佐證各項論點，並探討實務運作時面臨之問題與挑戰，最後提出建議及改進方向。
主要研究結論歸納整合如下：
一、 委外監管初始階段主要管理策略：委外監管前應先分析各項重要監管項目，納入評選機制及契約中規範，做為後續監管遵循的方針。
二、 委外監管過程階段主要管理策略：透過績效監控、定期溝通會議及查核作業，進行定期及不定期的監督控管；加強會面溝通的成效，建立委託人與受託人互相交流學習的管道。
三、 委外監管評估階段主要管理策略：評估階段應落實報酬與風險並重；建置風險量化系統及標準化的評估機制，以提供客觀的監管參考指標。

The asset scale of pension funds of our country is continue to progress. In order to combine the asset management with civil resources and to increase the performance of the investment, the percentage of pension fund management outsourcing has also been growing year by year. In order to ensure the quality of management outsourcing, besides a conscientious screening procedure, a well-framed supervisory mechanism is also required to ensure the safety of fund asset. The main theme of the study focuses on the supervisory mechanism of the public service pension fund by taking OLC theory as the core structure of the study, and it separates the outsourcing steps of the public service pension fund into three main parts, the preliminary step, the processing step and the assessing step. By analyzing managerial strategies in each steps and the results of case study, it is hoped that this study can bring up the solution to the problems met when the mechanism is put into practice.
The main conclusions of this study are as the following:
1. The main strategy of the preliminary step: is suggested to analyze the important items of supervision before outsourcing process, and to combine screening procedure with contract specifications as the guidelines for future supervision
2. The main strategy of the processing step: is suggested to proceed through performance monitoring, regular communication meetings and operations checking on a regular and irregular basis, and to strengthen the effectiveness of communication and regular meetings; and to strengthen on the spot project checks, which provide mutual learning opportunities.
3. The main strategy of the assessing step: is suggested to put equal weight on both performance in the assessing step, and a quantitative risk measure system combined with standardized reviewing mechanism should be established to provide an objective reference for Supervision.

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