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研究生: 林威利
Wili - Delima
論文名稱: Source Locator Autonomous System Traceback
Source Locator Autonomous System Traceback
指導教授: 洪西進
Shi-Jinn Horng
口試委員: 金台齡
Tai-Lin Chin
邱舉明
Ge-Ming Chiu
項天瑞
Tien-Ruey Hsiang
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 電資學院 - 資訊工程系
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering
論文出版年: 2010
畢業學年度: 98
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 50
中文關鍵詞: border routerpacket markingtracebackDDoS
外文關鍵詞: border router, packet marking, traceback, DDoS
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in the real world have become a major threat in Internet society. While the attack itself is rather easy to be performed by anyone, it is difficult for the victim to overcome the attacks. Researchers have to make some ways to face this problem such as building attack detection, prevention, mitigation, and follow-ups toward the attack. This research talks about one of follow-up action called Attack Traceback which tries to locate the original source of packet senders and reveals the path traversed by these packets during the attack.
We propose a traceback system called Source Locator Autonomous System Traceback (SLAST) which uses Autonomous System (AS) as the unit of tracing. This proposed system utilizes deterministic packet marking along with dynamic packet marking scheme where every packet have chance to be marked with partial node’s information when it passed through a marking router. We use 25 bits of marking information inside IP header in every packet to store information regarding the AS number and router ID. Because we overload the information inside the IP header field, thus this system doesn’t require additional bandwidth in its implementation.
Our proposed system can greatly suppress the number of false positive by utilizing hash number to find the attacker candidates and discarding the invalid nodes or path as well. Thus making this scheme has an optimal processing time and able to reconstruct the attacking path as well as the original source information. The proposed system is capable of tracing hundreds of nodes involved in attacks and can distinguish between the real source and the packet forwarder nodes with low false positives in the reconstruction result.
Our system result is analyzed and verified with simulation using real AS traceroute dataset from The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA). We compare our system with another system called FAST (Fast Autonomous System Traceback) and showed that our system outperforms the performance of FAST in speed, false positives, and path length problem. In addition, our system also provides the marking router ID of the attacker’s AS so the victim will have more information about the source of attack.


Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in the real world have become a major threat in Internet society. While the attack itself is rather easy to be performed by anyone, it is difficult for the victim to overcome the attacks. Researchers have to make some ways to face this problem such as building attack detection, prevention, mitigation, and follow-ups toward the attack. This research talks about one of follow-up action called Attack Traceback which tries to locate the original source of packet senders and reveals the path traversed by these packets during the attack.
We propose a traceback system called Source Locator Autonomous System Traceback (SLAST) which uses Autonomous System (AS) as the unit of tracing. This proposed system utilizes deterministic packet marking along with dynamic packet marking scheme where every packet have chance to be marked with partial node’s information when it passed through a marking router. We use 25 bits of marking information inside IP header in every packet to store information regarding the AS number and router ID. Because we overload the information inside the IP header field, thus this system doesn’t require additional bandwidth in its implementation.
Our proposed system can greatly suppress the number of false positive by utilizing hash number to find the attacker candidates and discarding the invalid nodes or path as well. Thus making this scheme has an optimal processing time and able to reconstruct the attacking path as well as the original source information. The proposed system is capable of tracing hundreds of nodes involved in attacks and can distinguish between the real source and the packet forwarder nodes with low false positives in the reconstruction result.
Our system result is analyzed and verified with simulation using real AS traceroute dataset from The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA). We compare our system with another system called FAST (Fast Autonomous System Traceback) and showed that our system outperforms the performance of FAST in speed, false positives, and path length problem. In addition, our system also provides the marking router ID of the attacker’s AS so the victim will have more information about the source of attack.

Abstract i Acknowledgment ii Table of Contents iii Table of Figures v Chapter 1 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Problem Statement 3 1.2 Research Objective 5 1.3 Thesis Contribution 5 1.4 Organization of the Thesis 5 Chapter 2 7 Related Works on Traceback Scheme 7 2.1 IP Traceback Scheme 7 2.1.1 Link Testing 8 2.1.2 Packet Logging 9 2.1.3 ICMP Traceback 10 2.1.4 Packet Marking 10 2.2 Autonomous System (AS) Traceback 11 Chapter 3 14 The Proposed Scheme 14 3.1 Autonomous System Number (ASN) as tracing unit 15 3.2 Problem Statement 15 3.2.1 Problem on few packets reconstruction system 15 3.2.2 Limited space in single packet reconstruction 16 3.3 System Overview 16 3.3.1 Marks Information 18 3.3.2 Node Information 18 3.3.3 Router ID Information 19 3.3.4 LINK Information 20 3.3.5 Distance Information 21 3.4 Marking Procedure 23 3.4.1 Static Marking Probability 24 3.4.2 Dynamic Marking Probability with Remarking-Allowed Policy 25 3.5 Marking Algorithm 26 3.6 Reconstruction Procedure 28 Chapter 4 33 Simulation Performance and Analysis 33 4.1 System Setup 33 4.2 Performance Metrics and Analysis 34 4.2.1 Number of FPs at First ASBR 34 4.2.2 Reconstruction Time 35 4.2.3 Packet required for reconstruction 35 4.3 Simulation Results 36 Chapter 5 38 Conclusion 38 References 39

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