探討總經理任期與企業多角化策略及企業績效之關係－股權結構之調節效果

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研究生：	陳昱菁 Yu-Jing Chen
論文名稱：	探討總經理任期與企業多角化策略及企業績效之關係－股權結構之調節效果 Explore the Relationship Between CEO Tenure, Corporate Diversification Strategies, and Firm Performance-The Moderating Effect of Ownership Structure
指導教授：	葉峻賓 Chun-Ping Yeh
口試委員:	張瀞文 Chin-Wen Chang 蕭義棋 Yi-Chi Hsiao
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	管理學院 - 科技管理研究所 Graduate Institute of Technology Management
論文出版年：	2023
畢業學年度：	111
語文別：	中文
論文頁數：	47
中文關鍵詞：	企業多角化、企業表現、總經理任期、冒險行為、總經理持股、外資持股
外文關鍵詞：	corporate diversification, risk-taking behavior, CEO shareholdings, foreign institution shareholdings
相關次數：	點閱：217 下載：3
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上一筆

過去文獻針對企業多角化及企業表現之關係並無一定論，企業採取多角化策略以達到分散風險及創造價值等目的，然而卻忽視了過度的多角化亦為一種冒險行為。從高層梯隊理論的角度而言，總經理作為企業決策者，任期是影響其決策的重要因素，由不同任期產生之不同的策略取向及風險偏好，將影響企業多角化程度及企業表現，而過往文獻針對總經理任期及冒險程度之關係亦存在分歧的發現。因此本研究旨在探討企業多角化策略和企業表現之關係，並從高層梯隊理論的觀點，進一步探討總經理任期與企業多角化程度之關係，同時考慮股權結構(總經理持股、外資持股)的調節效果。本研究資料取自台灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)，擷取2015~2021年台灣電腦與周邊產業共60間上市公司，採用一般線性迴歸變數(OLSRegression)，並發現(1) 企業多角化程度與企業表現呈倒U型關係；(2) 總經理任期與企業多角化程度呈U型關係；(3) 總經理持股可調節總經理任期與企業多角化程度之關係；(4) 外資持股無法有效調節總經理任期與企業多角化程度之關係。本研究之發現除補強過去企業多角化與企業表現之非線性關係相關文獻，於實務上也提供企業在面臨不同任期之總經理可採用的策略，以避免因不同冒險程度而導致企業表現負面的影響。

While companies adopt diversification strategies to achieve risk diversification and value creation, they often overlook the risks associated with excessive diversification investments. From the perspective of upper echelons theory, the CEO, as the decision-maker of the organization, plays a critical role in shaping the strategic direction and risk preferences of the firm, which in turn influence the level of diversification and firm performance. Previous studies have also yielded conflicting findings regarding the relationship between CEO tenure and risk-taking behavior. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relationship between corporate diversification strategies and firm performance, and further examine the relationship between CEO tenure and risk-taking behavior. The study also considers the moderating effects of ownership structure, including CEO and foreign institutions shareholding.
The study findings indicate that (1) There’s an inverted U-shaped relationship between corporate diversification level and firm performance (2) The relationship between CEO tenure and corporate diversification level is a U-shaped relationship (3) CEO shareholding can moderate the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate diversification level; however, foreign institution shareholdings does not effectively moderate the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate diversification level. In summary, this study not only contributes to the existing literature on the non-linear relationship between corporate diversification and firm performance but also provides practical implications for companies.

摘要 ................................................................................................................................... I
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... II
致謝 ................................................................................................................................ III
目錄 ................................................................................................................................ IV
圖目錄 ............................................................................................................................ VI
表目錄 ........................................................................................................................... VII
第一章、緒論 .................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 研究背景 ........................................................................................................... 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 ............................................................................................... 2
第二章、文獻探討 .......................................................................................................... 5
2.1 高層梯隊理論 (Upper Echelons Theory) ........................................................ 5
2.2 代理理論 (Agency Theory) .............................................................................. 5
2.3 企業多角化之效益與成本 ............................................................................... 5
2.3.1 企業多角化之效益 ................................................................................ 6
2.3.2 企業多角化之成本 ................................................................................ 8
2.4 總經理任期與冒險行為之關係 ....................................................................... 9
2.4.1 總經理任期與冒險行為為負相關 ...................................................... 10
2.4.2 總經理任期與冒險行為為正相關 ....................................................... 11
2.4.3 總經理任期與冒險行為為非線性關係 (倒U 型) .............................. 11
2.5 總經理持股比率 ............................................................................................. 12
2.6 外資(Foreign Institutions)持股比率 ............................................................... 13
第三章、假說發展與研究模型 .................................................................................... 14
3.1 企業多角化與企業表現之關係 ..................................................................... 14
3.2 總經理任期與企業多角化程度之關係 ......................................................... 15
V
3.3 總經理持股比率之調節效果 ......................................................................... 16
3.4 外資持股比率之調節效果 ............................................................................. 17
第四章、研究方法 ........................................................................................................ 18
4.1 資料收集與研究樣本 ..................................................................................... 18
4.2 研究變數 ......................................................................................................... 19
4.2.1 應變數 .................................................................................................. 19
4.2.2 自變數與調節變數 .............................................................................. 20
4.2.3 控制變數 .............................................................................................. 20
4.3 統計方法 ......................................................................................................... 22
第五章、實證結果 ........................................................................................................ 23
5.1 敘述性統計量與相關係數矩陣 ..................................................................... 23
5.2 迴歸分析結果 ................................................................................................. 27
5.2.1 企業多角化與企業表現 ...................................................................... 27
5.2.2 總經理任期與企業多角化程度 .......................................................... 30
5.2.3 總經理持股率之調節作用 .................................................................. 30
5.2.4 外資持股率之調節作用 ...................................................................... 30
5.2.5 穩健性測試 .......................................................................................... 34
第六章、研究發現與討論 ............................................................................................ 36
第七章、研究結論與建議 ............................................................................................ 39
7.1 文獻貢獻 ......................................................................................................... 39
7.2 實務貢獻 ......................................................................................................... 40
7.3 研究限制 ......................................................................................................... 40
參考文獻 ........................................................................................................................ 42
                                

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