在製造工業與再製造工業中，綠色化工業已經成為許多重要的議題之一。透過減少空氣汙染以及過度開發來減緩溫室效應，綠色工業扮演著關鍵的角色。政府們必須花費相當長的時間進行綠色機制設計，嘗試著透過政策的發佈，來有效的控制工廠的產出。因此，政府有了課徵汙染費的政策，並且必須在考慮多方面的利益下，去做合理的決策。一般來說，政府必須考慮社會福利、廠商們的利益和汙染費稅收的平衡。在執行完美的決策之下，不會發生廠商們的利益虧損以及社會福利的減少。順利的話，工廠不但可以獲利之外還能兼顧社會福利，如此一來，就可以提升工廠綠色化企業的商譽。若非如此，工廠恐怕面臨生存攸關的危機。對於決策者，也就是政府而言，在發佈政策階段上要正確地做出決策是相當重要的課題。
本研究宗旨在於，以賽局理論拓展式，在供應鏈中模擬政府與產業間的互動情形。在供應鏈中，以政府的決策出發，直到產業中所有的生產計劃與訂價策略的決策，都用決策變數來加以定義決策者之間的關係。在拓展式裡，我們將此決策分成兩群，其中包含金流與物流來模擬真實的情形。由於此賽局過於龐大而且複雜，所以我們根據競爭模型，將賽局分為三個階段，依序求解子賽局的完美納許均衡解，合併這些納許均衡解變成一組政府的完美政策。執行此完美政策，所有的廠商擁有這些子賽局完美納許均衡解作為最佳的生產計劃與訂價策略。從本論文個案研究中，我們亦發現在不同的市場環境下，決策者根據納許均衡來決策是非常實用且有效的方式。

Green industry has become one of the most important issues in both manufacturing and remanufacturing industry. It is vital for reducing the effect of global warming by reducing the air pollution and reducing the industrial advancement. Governments have to spend a long time to try to make the green policy to accomplish a mechanism which can successfully control the production strategy of all factories. Therefore, governments have to consider many various interests to make the perfect decision. Generally speaking, the governments have to consider the social welfare, the business profit of all factories and the balance of charging the pollution fee. By executing the perfect policy, the loss of profit from factories and the reducing social welfare should not be occurred. Moreover, if the decision for the all players is right, the factories can not only make profit from it but also care the social welfare. In this way, all factories can make good reputation of green business. Otherwise, the factories may face the crisis of going bankrupt, so it is very important for the decision (rule) maker, government to make proper decisions in every phase.
This study aims to use the extension form based on Game Theory to simulate the interactions of both the government and all factories in the supply chain. From the policy making of the government to all the production strategies and pricing strategy of every factory in the supply chain, we use the state variables to define the relationship of all the players. In the extension form, we divide the strategies into two kinds, including money flow and product flow, to simulate real world. Because the structure of the game is too tremendous and complicated, so we divide the game into three stages based on the competition models. Then we solve the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibriums sequentially, and combine these Nash Equilibriums into perfect policy of the government. By executing this perfect policy, all the factories can have the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibriums as the optimal production strategies and pricing strategy. Following our case study, we conclude that the proposed method is a very practical and efficient technique for the decision makers to decide the strategies in various market environments.

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