摘 要
中國從2006年新的公司法明確規定公司要“承擔企業社會責任”到現在已經有10年的時間了，中國的企業在履行企業社會責任（Corporate Social Responsibility）也有了明顯的進步。例如：上市公司的年報中要披露關於企業社會責任的相關信息；成立企業社會責任研究中心並編製中國企業社會責任發展指數等。過去以歐美國家為樣本之研究顯示在股權分散之經濟體制下公司普遍存在代理問題。亦即公司內部人持股越低（Insider Ownership）或管理權力（Managerial Power）越高，其企業社會責任投資越高。而中國目前仍存在許多國有企業，其股權結構明顯與西方國家不同。本研究主要從，「內部人持股」和「管理者權力」這兩方面探討中國企業在對企業社會責任投資時，是否亦存在代理問題。
本研究以2009-2015年中國上市公司作為樣本，研究結果發現內部人持股比例與對企業社會責任投資呈顯著負相關，表示當內部人持股比例越低，對企業社會責任的投資程度越高，此結果與文獻一致。另外，本研究發現管理者權力與對企業社會責任的投資呈顯著負相關，表示當管理者的權力越大對企業社會責任投資的程度越低，此結果與文獻並不相同。推測其原因有：由於無法取得管理者股份基礎薪酬（Stock-Based Compensation）的資料，本研究在衡量管理者權力代理變數與文獻有所不同，而造成對管理權力所表達的內涵不同。此外本研究還發現管理者權力與對企業社會責任投資呈非線性關係，即當管理者權力達到某一程度時對企業社會責任的投資趨於穩定。

ABSTRACT
In 2006, the rule about performing corporate social responsibility was explicitly stipulated in the newest Chinese Company Law. The capability of corporate social responsibility has been improved greatly by the Chinese enterprises during these ten years. Taking the listed companies as the example, they are required to disclose the information about corporate social responsibility in the annual reports; setting up a research center of corporate social responsibility and compiling the development index for corporate social responsibility. Basing on the samples of Occident in the past few years, the study has shown that the company generally has subject of agency problem during the economic system of equity separation. In another word, the investment of corporate social responsibility will increase when the insider ownership of the company decreases or managerial power of it increases. Although the ownership structure of state-owned business in China is visibly different from the western country, this study still wants to discuss the subject of agency problem from the ownership of insider and the managerial power, when the enterprises make their investment of corporate social responsibility in China.

This study is based on the sample of the Chinese listed companies between 2009 to 2015, the result shows that the percentage of insider ownership has a negative correlation with the investment of corporate social responsibility. The lower percentage of insider ownership will lead to the higher investment of corporate social responsibility. This result is in conformity with the literature. Additionally, this study finds that the managerial power has a negative correlation with the investment of corporate social responsibility. The higher managerial power leads to the lower investment of corporate social responsibility. However, it is conflict with the literature. This conflict may be caused by the missing information of stock-based compensation, and, the proxy variable of measuring the managerial power in this paper is different from the literature. Thus the meaning of managerial power in this paper is different with the literature. On the other hand, this study also finds that the relationship between managerial power and the investment of corporate social responsibility is non-monotonic and concave. The investment of corporate social responsibility tends to stabilization when the power of managers reaches to a certain extent.

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