隨著市場競爭白熱化，產品保固已成為買方考慮是否購買產品的必備條件之一，保固除了可以降低買方獲得不良品的風險，也可以間接監督賣方製造產品的品質，此一趨勢使保固契約也成為產品行銷的考量因素之一。一般而言賣方所提供的保固期可分為基本保固期和延長保固期兩種。由於在基本保固期內，賣方必須負擔產品失效時所產生的維修成本，之後則由買方負擔其維修成本。有鑑於此，賣方就產品可靠度與小修效益最佳化考量下提供延長保固服務；而買方則就機台使用時間與維修效益最佳化之理性考量下尋求購買延長保固之最佳決策。在雙方都有各自策略，使買賣雙方於簽定延長保固合約時形成理性考量下的非合作賽局。故本研究利用史塔克伯格領導者賽局以及垂直奈許賽局分別建構三種延長保固情境，並利用逆向歸納法求取各情境的最佳均衡解。分析顯示史塔克伯格領導者賽局中為領導者的一方，容易引導跟隨者做出最優決策；若以垂直奈許賽局決策則僅得各自的最佳解組合。

Market competition is making product warranty policy becomes one of the most required considerations for buyer's purchasing decisions. Therefore the warranty contract turns into a key perspective in product marketing owing to the warranty is not only to present risk reduction for buyers, but also to arise indirect supervisions of manufacturing quality for sellers. The seller provides basic and extended types of warranty to buyer. In the basic type of warranty, seller takes maintenance responsibility and cost, and then buyer takes afterward. This model makes seller determine a optimal policy to provide extended type warranty service under rational product reliability and minimum maintenance considerations. Hence buyer also forms an optimal decision to purchase the extended type warranty service by determining using time and utilities for minimum maintenance actions. Therefore both parties determine their own strategies in the extended warranty contract to be a rational non-cooperative game. In this study, we model a framework by using the Stackelberg leadership game and vertical Nash (VN) game to construct within three scenarios, and determine the equilibrium solutions for all scenarios by backward induction. The analysis result indicates the Stackelberg game is easier to approach an optimal equilibrium solution on condition that a follower-party could follow leader-party’s decision; the vertical Nash game only approach individual solution for each party.

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