Time, as one of most important factors in a successful construction project, can be traded between general contractor and subcontractors, as well as among subcontractors in sequential projects. In optimal case for trading time, they have reasonable incentive to cooperate. Moreover, relationships between general contractors and subcontractors – different level, and among subcontractors – same level as well also influent to their profit. The purpose of this study is to address the challenges in time management and finding the rational profit allocation among contractors. Based on game theory with Stackelberg model and Pareto optimal is applied to imitate complicated relationships in two-level game. Finally, a case study is represented to more comprehensively illustrate the problem. Results from utilization of the proposed model show that while optimizing total profit, all contractors can negotiate to fairly distribute benefits from cooperation in core space. The Shapley value and the nucleolus concepts can be suggested as well.

Time, as one of most important factors in a successful construction project, can be traded between general contractor and subcontractors, as well as among subcontractors in sequential projects. In optimal case for trading time, they have reasonable incentive to cooperate. Moreover, relationships between general contractors and subcontractors – different level, and among subcontractors – same level as well also influent to their profit. The purpose of this study is to address the challenges in time management and finding the rational profit allocation among contractors. Based on game theory with Stackelberg model and Pareto optimal is applied to imitate complicated relationships in two-level game. Finally, a case study is represented to more comprehensively illustrate the problem. Results from utilization of the proposed model show that while optimizing total profit, all contractors can negotiate to fairly distribute benefits from cooperation in core space. The Shapley value and the nucleolus concepts can be suggested as well.

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