長久以來，經營績效良好的公司，擬公開上市櫃前，必須將公司的股權做適當分散，以符合證交所及櫃買中心的要求。另一方面需提供專業經理人經營的長期誘因，使企業有優良的績效。在處理股權分散的同時，必須考慮若分配給經理人的持股若過高，會稀釋原始股東的權益；分配給經理人的持股太低，又唯恐經理人產生違背股東利益之行為，即原始股東（主理人）與經理人（代理人）之間的代理問題。本研究以2005年至2011年3月間台灣興櫃轉上櫃掛牌交易的公司為研究樣本，探討經理人上櫃前的持股數對公司正式掛牌上櫃時的公司價值是否有正向關係，並是否會因產業不同而有不同的影響程度，資料來源為台灣經濟新報資料庫。
實證結果發現，以總產業來看，經理人上櫃時持股數會對公司市值有正相關關係，其中又以電子產業有較顯著相關。若以經理人持股比例分產業別標準化分組後，發現比產業平均高0到0.5個標準差和比產業平均小0.5到1個標準差時，對市值最有正相關影響，並可進一步算出各產業的最適持股比例。

Following the regulations of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and those of the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM), companies disperse shareholding accordingly before their initial public offering (IPO). Meanwhile, they also need to provide professional managers with long-term incentives, such as shareholding, to ensure managers’ devotion and thus company performance. Such circumstances lead to an agency problem between the original shareholders (the Principal) and the managers (the Agent): if the managers’ shareholding is too high, it dilutes the shareholders’ equity; if it is too low, it runs the risk of driving the managers against the shareholders’ interests. This study examines the relationship between managers’ ownership before IPO on the over-the-counter (OTC) market and a company’s market value after it and if such relationship varies from industry to industry by analyzing the data of Taiwanese companies that went over the counter from 2005 to 2011. The data are collected from the database of the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).
Our empirical results show that managers’ ownership is positively related to their company’s market value, especially in the electronics industry. Furthermore, having divided into groups the managers’ ownership proportions, first standardized within each industry, we have found that the optimal ownership, i.e. proportions most positively related to the market value, falls within the range between 0 to 0.5 standard deviation higher than and 0.5 to 1 standard deviation lower than the industry average, and on the basis of the result, we have been able to calculate the optimal ownership percentage for each industry.

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