本文透過主路徑分析(main path analysis)等量化工具，探討過去30年間公司治理領域之理論發展。我們選定代理理論(agency theory)及股東行動主義(shareholder activism) 作為研究主軸。代理理論(agency theory)是公司治理極為重要之理論基礎，而在恩龍（Enron）案及2008年全球金融風暴爆發後，不少學者指出，股東行動主義(shareholder activism)應可有效彌補代理理論之不足。我們認為，此研究應能描繪出近年公司治理領域之發展面貌。

研究結果顯示，代理理論發展已逐漸由Principal-Agent (P-A) model轉換為Principal-Principal (P-P) model，研究重心亦由美國等已開發國家，轉往亞洲等新興市場，而研究領域也逐漸偏向企業社會責任等非經濟議題。

在股東行動主義方面，我們首度涵蓋法律、財務及管理等相關期刊研究，並發現近年新興領域包括企業主管薪酬審核、企業社會責任、氣候變遷，以及社會責任投資(social responsibility investment)等。此外，因機構投資人的興起，股東行動主義亦使「股東-經營團隊」互動關係發生變化，經營決策權由經營團隊向股東挪移，且有逐漸與勞工或環保等社會運動結合之趨勢。

This research contributes to the literature on corporate governance with the agency perspective and shareholder activism by identifying the development, divergence, research fronts, and knowledge diffusion paths in an over-30-year time frame. Regarding corporate governance with the agency perspective, we examined 2,748 relevant papers from the Web of Science (WOS) database and found that the combined results of main path, key phrase, and growth curve analyses demonstrate two divergences, two promising fields, and one trend of knowledge diffusion. The findings illustrated that the grand trend of knowledge diffusion is from the principal-agent model to the principal-principal model theoretically and from the U.S.-based contexts to the emerging countries-based contexts geographically.

The Enron scandal and 2008 global financial crisis saw scholars argue that corporate governance methods derived from agency perspective framework still have not achieved their intended functions. We further adopted main path analysis to map out the evolution and research fronts of shareholder activism spanning over 30 years. The results indicated that shareholder activism research has developed in several stages: discussions on theoretical foundation, explorations on the “shareholder activism versus firm performance” correlation, the exceptions of the “one-share, one-vote” rule, the emergence of hedge fund activism research, and the recent “say-on-pay” campaigns.

We also employed edge-betweenness based clustering to categorize the citation network into coherent groups, including “pressure and monitoring from institutional investors”, “shareholder activism in CSR and climate change”, “say-on-pay movement and board responsiveness”, and “shareholder voting and shareholder rights”, which are the most popular themes over the period 2003 to 2013. Generally, the power shift from management to shareholders was identified via this analysis, explaining how shareholder activism mitigates the issues of agency theory. This research should contribute to future studies in both practical and academic arenas.

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