近年來，台灣受氣候變遷的影響，造成旱澇不均的極端氣候更加頻繁，並且受地形所限難以有效保留雨水，因此水資源經常出現捉襟見肘的窘況，有鑑於此，實施節水政策刻不容緩。然而目前臺灣用水結構以農業用水占比最多，高達百分之七十，因此從農業用水進行管理介入是解決臺灣水資源不足的方法之一。但由於用水單位的風險態度會顯著影響其決策，且由於水資源是農業生產的關鍵要素，因此使用水單位在節水上的決策往往更加謹慎，當風險趨避程度高的情況下，可能導致節水政策參與度降低。
本研究考慮用水單位存在風險趨避（risk aversion）情況下，運用委託代理之賽局機制設計為基礎，建構農業節水補貼機制模型及兩部分農業節水補貼（two-part subsidy）機制模型，並求解資訊對稱及不對稱時的最佳補貼、最佳節水量及最佳努力程度。本研究結果不僅提供不同形式的補貼，也能幫助管制單位建立針對風險趨避之用水單位的補貼誘因，促成社會效益最大化之目的。

In recent years, Taiwan has been affected by climate change, resulting in extreme weather with droughts and floods. Furthermore, due to the specific terrain structure of Taiwan, it is difficult to effectively retain rainwater. In view of this, it is imperative to implement water-saving policies. Because agricultural water consumption accounts for 70% of Taiwan’s water usage at present, better management of agricultural water uses thus can help solving the issue of shortage of water resources in Taiwan. However, the risk attitude of water users significantly affects their decision-making. Since water is a key element of agricultural production, agricultural water users tend to be more cautious in their decision-making on water conservation. If the degree of risk aversion is high, it may lead to lower participation in water conservation practices.
This study designs game-theoretic mechanism models for water resource management based on the concept of principal-agent theory. In particular, under the assumption that the water users are risk-averse, an agricultural water-saving subsidy mechanism model and a two-part agricultural water-saving subsidy mechanism model are formulated and solved analytically. The results of this study suggest useful guidelines for regulators to design subsidies that can provide sufficient incentives for risk-averse agricultural water users to make appropriate water saving effort to maximize social benefits.

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