公司彼此間發生董事連結的情形，不論在國外或國內，均已可算是一普遍的現象。在如此競爭激烈的環境中，董事連結實為公司一項重要的策略機制。例如，依據「資源相依理論」的說法，公司透過董事連結，能獲取重要的資源或有利的資訊，使公司能降低其所處環境的不確定性，進而提昇公司的績效。
本研究利用台灣2007年1月當時所有至少聘任一席以上獨立董事的上市、上櫃公司為樣本，共計558家，計算各家公司與他家公司的董事連結數目作為應變數，以及各家公司2006年度的相關財報資料及其它可能影響董事連結數目的因子作為自變數，透過皮爾森相關檢定與Tobit模型等統計方法來分析。主要的目的，即在於探究哪些公司特質變數與董事連結數目有顯著的關係。
　　本研究實證結果發現，董事會規模、公司資產總額、稅前淨利、全體董事持股比率、平均每位董事酬勞與董事連結數目有顯著的正向關係。而負債比率、公司本質 ( 是否為金融機構 )、董事平均出席率與董事連結的數目有顯著的負向關係。此實證結果支持資源相依理論，但不支持管理控制理論、銀行控制理論、銀行霸權理論。

Interlocking directorates between companies is a popular phenomenon whether in Taiwan or abroad. In such competitive environment, interlocking directorates serve as an important strategy mechanism in a company. For example, company can gain important resources and favorable information through board interlocks according to “Resource Dependency Theory.” It can reduce uncertainty in the organization’s environment, and improve organization’s performance.
　　I use the 558 listed companies with at least one outside director in January, 2007 in this study. The number of interlock directorates serves as dependent variable. The data within financial statement of company for 2006 and other factors that may affect the number of interlocking directorates serve as explanatory variables. Then, I use the Pearson correlation test and Tobit model to analysis data. The Object is to find which variables are significantly correlated to interlocking directorates.
　　I found that board size, total asset, net income before tax, fractional ownership of all directors, average pay of directors are significantly positive correlated with board interlocks, and debt ratio, the nature of company ( financial or non-financial ) , average attending ratio of directors are significantly negative correlated with board interlocks. These findings support the “Resource Dependency Theory,” but don’t support “Bank Control Theory,” “Management Control Theory” and “Bank Hegemony Theory”.

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