自1998年以來，台灣在稅法上為避免股東的股利被政府重複課稅，企業均採用「全額設算扣抵制」。政府課徵公司營利事業所得稅後，在課徵股東股利所得稅時，允許股東將公司所繳納之營所稅完全設算扣抵股東之股利所得稅。但從2015年開始，台灣將稅制從「全額設算扣抵制」改為「部分設算扣抵制」。在新制下，只有50％的可扣抵稅額可用於抵消股東的個人綜合所得稅。
根據2016年的報稅數據顯示，2015年個人所得稅收入為新台幣1,440億元，較上年同期增加230億。個人所得稅收入增長的主因係來自此項稅法的變革，但仍少於原本預期值約500至600億。根據財政部提供的資訊，一些公司選擇在改制前支付更多的股利，增加稅收的差距，另一種可能是此項稅制改變，使管理者較有誘因從事避稅活動，導致稅收短缺，因此本研究將探討稅制改變的情況下，如何影響公司的避稅行為，以及債權人是以何種角度去看待公司的避稅活動。
首先，在全額設算扣抵制之下允許股東只支付企業所得稅和股東股利所得稅之間的差額，因此在此制度下的公司，避稅只是將稅賦從公司轉移給股東。此外，規劃及執行避稅策略會產生成本，造成股東可用的稅後現金流減少。因此，如果管理者的決策中有考慮股東稅後之現金流量，則較不可能在全額設算扣抵制下從事避稅行為。
第二，此項租稅改革降低了股東可扣抵稅額的價值及需求。為了補償股東可扣抵稅額中的價值損失，在部分設算扣抵制中管理者可能通過公司避稅行為，來尋求增加股東可獲得的稅後現金流。如附錄二所示，部分設算扣抵制下，透過積極稅務規劃策略可使股東可獲得的稅後淨現金流入增加。因此，稅法的變革很有可能使管理人員參與更積極的稅務規劃活動。
第三，先前學者發現，企業之股利政策及租稅規劃，會考慮投資者的偏好。在全額設算扣抵制下，因可扣抵稅額較高，所以股東偏好收到股利。因此，管理人員有較大的誘因去支付公司稅，從而產生有價值的可扣抵稅額，以分配給股東。由於股東可扣抵稅額在2015年後減弱對股東的吸引力，因此部分設算扣抵制會削弱管理者納稅的動機。
最後，本研究發現台灣在2015年稅法改變後，會造成財稅差異增加，亦即企業會增加避稅活動，雖在統計上不顯著，但兩者間存在正相關且符合原先預期。此外，以債權人的觀點來說，增加避稅活動的舉動，會使其覺得授信風險提高，因此給予企業的利率提高，造成企業債務成本上升。

Companies in Taiwan have been operating a full dividend imputation system (hereafter,DIS) since 1998 to prevent double taxation of dividends. Starting in 2015, Taiwan changed her tax system from a full to partial DIS. Under the partial DIS, only 50% of the dividend imputation credit (hereafter, IC) can be used to offset a resident shareholder's individual income tax liability.
According to tax filing data in 2016, personal income tax revenue for 2015 amounts to NT$144 billion increased by NT$23 billion from a year earlier. The growth in personal income tax revenue mainly comes from this legislative change, but it is less than the expected amount ranging from NT$50 to $60 billion. According to Ministry of Finance, some companies choose to pay more dividends prior to the new tax rule results in this tax revenue gap. Alternatively, we argue that this legislative change provides a stronger influence to any incentive managers may have to engage in tax avoidance activities, which may also account for the shortage of tax revenue. The first objective of this paper is to investigate how the 2015 legislative change in Taiwan affects the corporate tax avoidance behavior. The second objective of this paper is to understand the creditor's viewpoint about the tax avoidance activities.
The full DIS allows shareholders to pay for only the difference between the corporate income tax and the shareholder’s income tax on dividends. Thus, corporate tax avoidance under a full DIS merely shifts the burden of tax payments from corporations to shareholders. Consequently, a full DIS largely eliminates managerial incentives to engage in tax avoidance activities. In addition, tax aggressive arrangements are costly, thus after-tax cash flows available to shareholders most likely will decrease. As a result, if managers incorporate shareholder-level taxes into their managerial decision, they are less likely to engage in tax avoidance under a full DIS.
Finally, the study found that Taiwan changed her tax system from a full to partial DIS will result in increasing tax avoidance activities. Although it is not statistically significant, there is a positive correlation between the two behaviors and it is consistent with our original expectations. In addition, from the creditor's viewpoint, the increase in tax avoidance activities will increase the risk exposure, so the creditor will increase the interest rates, resulting in rising corporate debt costs.

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