本研究主要在探討聘任之非內部董事特質對公司股東財富的影響，首先，以羅吉斯迴歸來分析何種特性的公司會去聘任非內部董事，再進一步採用事件研究法及複迴歸模式來探討非內部董事之聘任宣告效果，然而，除從公司特性分析外，並加入非內部董事的身分（是否為CEO、學歷背景）之非財務面因素，來探究影響非內部董事聘任宣告效果之原由。
在聘任情形與公司特性方面，實證結果發現：1.公司聘任非內部董事之類型，會傾向與解任之董事相同。2.內部人士持股比率越低的公司，越傾向去聘任獨立董事，而成長機會越高的公司，則越傾向聘任灰色董事。3.被聘公司之規模越小、績效越佳的CEO，越容易被聘任為獨立董事。
在聘任宣告效果方面，結果顯示：1.聘任董事之特質不同，對公司股東財富的影響也會不同，尤其是當聘任CEO為非內部董事時，對其聘任宣告效果會有顯著正面影響，此外，在聘任獨立董事時，其學歷背景為管理或理工背景對公司股東財富也有正向的效果。2.內部人士及機構法人持股比率愈高、規模越小及績效越好的公司，聘任非內部董事對股東財富有正向的影響。

The research mainly sets to throw the non-inside directors appointment impact on shareholder's wealth. First of all, we analyzed with Logistic regression which kind of characteristic company will appoint the non-inside directors, and further, adopted event studying and multiple regression model to examine the announcement effect of the non-inside directors. However, except that company's characteristic, we also explored that the identity (CEO、academic background) of the non-inside director impact on announcement effects.
In the way of the non-insider appointment and company's characteristic, find as a result：（1）The appointees are more likely to replace outgoing directors of the same classification.（2）Companies with lower inside ownership are more likely to appoint independent directors, and then with high growth opportunities are more likely to appoint gray directors.（3）Outside CEOs are more likely to get directorship when their own firms’ size is smaller and performance is better.
In the way of the announcement effect, find as a result：（1）The various specialities of director appointment are differently impact on the shareholder's wealth, especially when appointments of CEOs as non-inside directors, it have positive announcement effects. In addition, the background of independent director, controlled in the estimation by the inclusion of both an MBA and a science degree indicator, are positively associated with the shareholder's wealth.（2）Companies with high inside and institutional ownership, small size or better performance are positively impact on the announcement effect of the non-inside director appointment.

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