企業投入研發是促進產業發展的重要驅動力，政府為鼓勵企業投入研發而制定相關補助計畫，政府補助對企業投入研發的影響也一直是廣泛討論的議題，過去許多研究表示政府補助對企業投入研發具有積極的影響，然而有一些研究卻發現政府補助對企業投入研發產生排擠效果（Crowding Out Effect），本研究以臺灣經濟部技術處「A+企業創新研發淬鍊計畫」核定補助清單為依據，使用臺灣經濟新報（TEJ）資料庫收集獲得此計畫補助之上市櫃企業2014年至2022年的財務與公司治理資料，透過Probit迴歸分析進行研究假說驗證，實證結果表示政府補助金額越高會強化企業投入研發的排擠效果。

根據代理人理論（Agency theory），委託人利用監督機制與激勵措施可以改善代理人風險趨避傾向，而有研究表示外國董事與獨立董事具有加強監督的作用，亦有研究表示所有權與經營權合一（經理人兼任董事）有激勵的作用，因此透過Probit迴歸分析外國董事、獨立董事、經理人兼任董事占比對政府補助與企業投入研發所受的排擠效果之機率間的關係，實證結果表示外國董事、經理人兼任董事占比越高時，政府補助與企業投入研發所受的排擠效果之機率間的關係會被弱化，然而獨立董事占比對政府補助與企業投入研發所受的排擠效果之機率間的關係則無顯著影響。

Business investment in research and development (R&D) is a vital driver of industrial development. To encourage such investment, governments implement relevant subsidy programs. The impact of government subsidies on R&D investment by enterprises has been a widely debated topic. Previous studies have indicated a positive impact of government subsidies on R&D investment, while some have found evidence of crowding-out effects. This research utilizes the approved subsidy list from Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs' "A+ Industrial Innovation R&D Program" and collects financial and corporate governance data from listed companies that received subsidies from 2014 to 2022 using the Taiwan Economic Journal ( TEJ ) database. Probit regression analysis is employed to test the research hypotheses. The empirical results indicate that higher government subsidy amounts strengthen the crowding-out effects on R&D investment by enterprises.
According to agency theory, principals can improve agents' risk-averse behavior through supervisory mechanisms and incentive measures. Previous research has suggested that foreign directors and independent directors play a role in enhancing supervision, while other studies have indicated the incentive effect of aligning ownership and managerial control (managerial directors). Therefore, through Probit regression analysis, the relationship between the proportions of foreign directors, independent directors, and managerial directors and the probability of crowding-out effects from government subsidies on R&D investment is examined. The empirical results reveal that a higher proportion of foreign directors and managerial directors weakens the relationship between government subsidies and crowding-out effects on R&D investment. However, the proportion of independent directors does not significantly affect the relationship between government subsidies and crowding-out effects on R&D investment.

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