本研究主要目的在於探討分析師的監理功能對於公司市場價值的影響，亦即探討不同分析師報導公司的數量，是否可激勵公司管理者、降低代理成本，進而使公司市場價值上升。除此之外，本研究所探討分析師對公司價值的影響關係在金融風暴前及金融風暴後是否有差異。本研究之對象為台灣證券交易所之掛牌上市公司與中華民國櫃檯買賣中心之上櫃公司，資料期間為2005年1月1日到2007年12月31日及2009年1月1日到2011年12月31日。藉由迴歸分析結果發現，分析師的監理功能對於公司市場價值有顯著正面影響，亦即不同分析師報導公司的數量，可以激勵公司管理者、降低代理成本，進而使公司市場價值上升。此外，投資人在投資之前，可以根據本研究之研究結果，觀察使用金融海嘯前後作用相同之指標，作為投資高市場價值公司之參考。

The main purpose of this study is to explore the influence of the Supervision function of the analyst for the market value of company. That is to explore whether the number of companies different analyst reports would encourage company managers to reduce agency costs, thereby enabling the company's market value to rise or not. Besides, this research probes the relationship between the value of the
company and analysts and whether there are differences before and after the economic crisis. In this study, the object is the TWSE and GTSM Listed Companies. Data time is from 2005/01/01 to 2011/12/31.
By using regression analysis, it is found that the supervision function of the analyst have a significant positive effect on the company's market value. That is, the amount of reports that different analysts publish could encourage company managers and reduce agency costs,
thereby enabling the company's market value to rise. What’s more, according to the findings of this study, investors can observe before and after the financial crisis of the same indicators as a reference before investing high market value companies.

中文文獻
1. 郭秋榮，(2009)，「全球金融風暴之成因、對我國影響及因應對策之探討」，經濟研究，第9期，台北。
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