本研究探討資訊不對稱與代理問題程度是否影響企業融資決策，透過主成分分析形成資訊不對稱的單一指標，且自由現金流量做為代理問題之變數。利用普通最小平方法與Panel Data分析資料，以2010年至2016年台灣33家企業為樣本。本研究結論如下：1.當企業有資金需求時，資訊不對稱程度與企業負債融資程度呈正向關係，即為當資訊不對稱程度嚴重時，企業融資決策傾向以負債融資。2.當企業有資金需求時，代理問題與企業負債融資程度呈反向關係，即當代理問題程度越嚴重時，企業融資決策將減少負債融資。3.在同時考慮資訊不對稱與代理問題下，代理問題相較於資訊不對稱更能解釋企業融資行為。

This study is the effects of financing decision on information asymmetry and agency problem. The information asymmetry is formed through the principal component. The free cash flow is used as the variable of the agency problem. Using the ordinary least square method and panel data to analyze 33 companies from 2010 to 2016. The conclusion of this study are as follows:1.The level of information asymmetry is positively related to the level of debt financing when firms have financing deficit, that is, financing decisions tend to use debt financing when firms have the higher level of information asymmetry.2.The level of agency problem is negatively related to the level of debt financing when firms have financing deficit, t hat is, financing decisions tend to reduce debt financing when firms have the higher level of agency problem.3.Considering information asymmetry and agency problem, the agency problem can explain the financing decision better than information asymmetry.

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