在公司的經營方式中，不同管理者控制的公司，其經營想法、方式皆不同。現代化公司的所有權與經營權分離使得經理人必須替委託人面對各種經營狀況，而外在環境的變動也會影響不同規模的公司有不同的經營困境。因此在執行決策過程中有可能包含違法活動如逃漏稅，值得實務工作者多加關注。本研究試圖探討經理人控制的公司與逃漏稅之關係，以公司是否為上市公司為調節變項，檢驗其對經理人控制的公司與逃漏稅之調節效果。再者，探討公司規模與逃漏稅之關係，以公司預測法律與法規程度為調節變項，檢驗其對公司規模與逃漏稅之調節效果。在研究方法上，本研究以WBES蒐集之泰國企業相關資料，進行研究探討，總計有422個樣本。研究結果顯示：(1)公司規模與逃漏稅之間具有負向關係；(2)公司預測法律與法規改變的程度會調節公司規模與逃漏稅之間的負向關係。意即，當公司預測法律與法規改變的程度愈高時，會弱化大型公司與逃漏稅之負向關係。

There are a variety ways for administrators to manage the company. However, different administrators-controlled companies, that they all have different business ideas, methods to operate their company. Modernization of the company's separation of ownership and management allows managers to face a variety of operating conditions for the principal, outer change in the environment will also affect companies of different sizes have different operating difficulties. Therefore, the implementation of decision-making process may contain illegal activities such as tax evasion that practitioners should pay more attention to these issues. This study attempts to investigate the relationship between manager-controlled companies and tax evasion. This study also explores the moderating role of the company is a listed company on the above relationship.
Furthermore, this study investigates the relationship between firm size and tax evasion, and explores the moderating role of the predictability of law and regulatory on the above relationship.
Results from a Thailand sample of 422 of WBES indicate that (1) Firm size is negatively related to tax evasion; (2) The negatively relationship between firm size and tax evasion is moderated by the predictability of law and regulatory.

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