The Internet of Vehicles is the evolution of the conventional Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET), which refers to the network of different entities, such as vehicles, pedestrians, roads, city infrastructure, etc., and provides real-time communication among them. In many countries worldwide, quality emergency services are being challenged by the following factors: the stochasticity of call demand in space and time, the limited supply of resources, and traffic congestion.
In this thesis, we bring out a notion that allows a common vehicle to be dynamically authorized to an emergency vehicle (EV) identity. Before the vehicle joins the IoV network, the legality of the driver’s identity is authenticated by the fingerprint-secure USB flash drive. After EV completes the authentication with the first RSU, it only needs to calculate several necessary parameters to realize the authentication in the subsequent authentication. The proposed protocol preserved the lower computation and communication costs by utilizing the ECC algorithm and secured against well-known attacks.

The Internet of Vehicles is the evolution of the conventional Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET), which refers to the network of different entities, such as vehicles, pedestrians, roads, city infrastructure, etc., and provides real-time communication among them. In many countries worldwide, quality emergency services are being challenged by the following factors: the stochasticity of call demand in space and time, the limited supply of resources, and traffic congestion.
In this thesis, we bring out a notion that allows a common vehicle to be dynamically authorized to an emergency vehicle (EV) identity. Before the vehicle joins the IoV network, the legality of the driver’s identity is authenticated by the fingerprint-secure USB flash drive. After EV completes the authentication with the first RSU, it only needs to calculate several necessary parameters to realize the authentication in the subsequent authentication. The proposed protocol preserved the lower computation and communication costs by utilizing the ECC algorithm and secured against well-known attacks.

Recommendation Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Approval Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Elliptic Curve Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Elliptic Curve Key Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement . . 9
2.2 Fingerprint-secured USB flash drive . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 System Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Applicable Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4 Security and Privacy Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 Proposed Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1 System Initialization Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2 Roadside Unit Registration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3 Vehicle Registration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4 Emergency Vehicle Authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . 25
5.5 Emergency Vehicle Verification Phase . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5.1 RSU - EV Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5.2 Vehicle - EV Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Security and Performance Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2 Feature Comparison and Performance Analysis . . . . . . 38
6.2.1 Security Features Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.2 Computation Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2.3 Communication Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.4 Total Time Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

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