本研究實證結果顯示：(1)家族企業的股權偏離程度較非家族企業來得嚴重：家族企業股權結構確實有較非家族企業集中的現象，以股權偏離程度衡量核心代理問題中發現所有企業之股權偏離程度越大績效越差，也因家族企業控制權與所有權合一，故在股權偏離程度較非家族企業嚴重且對於績效的影響力較大。(2)家族企業與非家族企業之股權結構與績效具有非線性倒U之關係：內部人持股率和董監事持股率在家族及非家族企業中與績效都具有先升後降之非線性關係，先行支持管家理論及利益收斂假說，超出最適持股率時才轉而發生代理理論及管理據守假說，經理人持股率僅在家族企業中有與績效呈現倒U的非線性關係，在非家族企業經理人持股率則與績效為正向之關係支持管理據守及利益收斂假說，因此建議非家族企業若能增加經理人的持股，此對於企業績效能有正面的影響。(3)機構法人能有效監督企業之表現：相較一般投資者，機構法人擁有較專業且豐富的資訊故增加持股與公司表現有正向之關係，支持效率監督假說。(4)董事長兼任總經理有失監督效果：發現若董事長兼任總經理則缺少董事監督管理者的效果。

然而在家族企業中總經理是否為家族企業及外部董事比率與績效之影響上，在家族企業總經理是否為專業經理人亦或家族成員則與績效不具顯著效果，在外部董事比例上僅在家族企業中具有監督績效的作用，若家族企業外部董事比例增加市場將會有較好的績效表現，但非家族企業則無。

This paper examines the effect of equity structure, board composition, and characteristics of family companies in corporate governance on company performance in family firms and non-family firms. By utilizing panel data regression model to investigate 276 family firms and 339 non-family firms in Taiwan between 2000 and 2016. The empirical results of this study show:

(1)Since the control and ownership of the family business are united. The ownership structure of family firms is more concentrated than that of non-family firms. Measuring the core agency problem with the degree of deviation from control right shows that the greater the degree of deviation from control right impact the worse the performance in all company. The deviation from control right in family firms is more serious than that of non-family firms.

(2)The insider shareholding ratio and the shareholding ratio of the directors and supervisors have a non-linear relationship between performance in both family and non-family firms. The result proved that equity agency problem, entrenchment hypothesis, stewardship theory and entrenchment hypothesis. Manager’s shareholding ratio is U curve related to performance in family companies. The non-family business manager's shareholding ratio is a positive relationship with performance to support stewardship theory and entrenchment hypothesis. Therefore, it is suggested that non-family firms can increase manager’s shareholding, which has a positive impact on business performance.

(3)Compared with ordinary investors, institutional have more professional and abundant information and therefore have a positive relationship with their shareholdings and company performance. Institutional can effectively monitor the performance of the company.

(4)Discovered that if the chairman of the board is concurrently general manager, the lack of directors to supervise the effectiveness of the manager.

Whether the general manager of a family business is a professional manager or a family member has no significant effect on performance. On the proportion of outside directors, only the family company has the effect of supervising performance. If the proportion of outside directors of a family business increases, the market will be better performance, but not for non-family companies.

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