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研究生: 陳俊賢
Chun-Hsien Chen
論文名稱: 透過內網偵查與權限跳脫特徵使用不尋常事件分析偵測潛在橫向移動
Detecting Potential Lateral Movement by Internal Reconnaissance and Privilege Escalation Feature using Unusual Event Analysis
指導教授: 李漢銘
Hahn-Ming Lee
口試委員: 林豐澤
Feng-Tse Lin
鄭欣明
Shin-Ming Cheng
鄧惟中
Wei-Chung Teng
毛敬豪
Ching-Hao Mao
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 電資學院 - 資訊工程系
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering
論文出版年: 2018
畢業學年度: 106
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 77
中文關鍵詞: 橫向移動內網偵查權限跳脫審計分析
外文關鍵詞: Lateral Movement, Internal Reconnaissance, Privilege Escalation, audit analysis
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近年來駭客的攻擊手法不斷的更新,駭客為了達到政治上或者經濟上的效益,逐漸繁衍出一種針對特定政府或者企業的攻擊手法。一旦成功滲透進企業內部一台電腦,駭客會在企業中長期潛伏,讓一般的入侵偵測系統 (IDS) 難以偵測和預防,我們稱這的攻擊方式為進階式持續攻擊(Advanced Persistent Threats; APT)。 APT是非常複雜的攻擊,所以有人將APT分為六階段,其中橫向移動階段是最重要也最花時間並且留下最多紀錄的階段,駭客會在這個階段探索內網的架構,並且試圖擴散到其他電腦。 因此,在本論文中,我們提出一個系統可以偵測在整個內網中,那些電腦是有可能進行橫向移動。

在先前的研究中,都是在駭客移動到其他電腦後根據移動所留下來的痕跡去偵測,但是駭客已經對企業造成傷害。在我們的研究中發現,在駭客移動到其他電腦之前會有固定前兆,駭客必需要先作內網偵測才能夠知道內網的整個架構,也需要權限跳脫才能得到儲存在記憶體中的使用者密碼。 我們參考許多實際案例,發現在內網偵測和權限跳脫中駭客都會使用到不尋常的事件,因此提出了Rare Behavior Score來判斷哪些事件是不尋常的。我們也根據實際案例統整成7個特徵,並且使用這些特徵成功的偵測到潛在橫向移動。

在本實驗中,我們使用由資策會提供的模擬真實企業內網平台,並使用該平台蒐集Windows Event Logs,分析Windows Event Logs來偵測潛在橫向移動。 根據實驗結果,本研究所提出的偵測機制,對於潛在橫向移動偵測,可以到達73.86% 的F1-measure。本研究有以下幾點貢獻:(1)發展出一個輕量級的系統,並且能夠在橫向移動發生之前提早偵測。(2)統整出了內網偵查跟權限跳脫的特徵。(3)先前研究的攻擊資料是去模擬駭客的攻擊,我們的研究是使用真實世界中駭客會使用的工具來產生我們的攻擊資料。


In recent years, hackers' attack techniques have constantly updated. To achieve political or economic benefits, hackers have gradually developed an attack method for specific governments or enterprises. When successfully entry the company intranet, hackers will latent in the enterprise for a long time that making the Intrusion-detection system (IDS) challenging to detect and prevent. This kind attack is called "Advanced Persistent Threats, APT." APT is a very sophisticated attack, so some people divide APT into six stages. The lateral movement phase is the most important, time-consuming and leaves the most records. Hackers will explore the topography of the intranet at this stage and try to spread to other computers. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a system that can detect that the computer is trying to move laterally throughout the intranet.

In previous studies, researchers detected lateral movement after hackers successfully move within enterprises, which means that the damage has already been caused to the enterprises. In our research, we observe that a precursor often occurs before hackers move through the network. To understand the internal network topography of an enterprise, hackers always scan the internal network through intranet reconnaissance. Moreover, hackers obtain the highest privilege to acquire users password through privilege escalation. According to the cased in the real world environment, we observe that hackers generate unusual events in intranet reconnaissance and privilege escalation. Therefore, we integrate seven features based on the real cases and verify that potential lateral movement is successfully detected with these features.

The proposed approach gives the following contributions: (1) Developing an efficient system that can early detect lateral movement. (2)Investigating the feature of Internal Reconnaissance and Privilege Escalation. (3)Implementing a more realistic evaluation of lateral movement comparing with previous work. Our experiment runs in a simulated real enterprise intranet provided by Institute for Information Industry. Our proposed approach can achieve 73.86% F1-measure in the average case.

1. Introduction 1.1 Motivation 1.2 Challenges and Goals 1.3 Contributions 1.4 The Outline of Thesis 2. Background 2.1 Advanced Persistent Threats(APT) 2.2 Lateral Movement 2.2.1 Credential-based 2.2.2 Share-based 2.2.3 Exploitation-based 2.2.4 Physical-based 2.3 Intrusion Detection System 2.3.1 Host-based Intrusion Detection System 2.3.2 Network-based Intrusion Detection System 3. System Description 3.1 Internal Reconnaissance and Privilege Escalation in Lateral Movement 3.2 Security Logs Extractor 3.3 Session-based Event Aggregator 3.4 Unusual Logon and Process Event Scoring 3.5 Internal Reconnaissance and Privilege Escalation Feature Extractor 3.6 Potential Lateral Movement Trainer 4. Experiments and Results 4.1 Environment and Dataset 4.1.1 Dataset Environment 4.1.2 Dataset Collection and Label 4.1.3 Attack Scenario 4.2 Internal Reconnaissance and Privilege Escalation 4.2.1 Internal Reconnaissance 4.2.2 Privilege Escalation 4.3 Evaluation Metrics 4.4 The Result of the Experiments 4.4.1 Effectiveness of the Baseline 4.4.2 Effectiveness of the Different Features and Parameters 4.4.3 Efficiency Comparison with Association Rules 4.4.4 Effectiveness Comparison with Antivirus 4.4.5 Effectiveness Comparison with Rule-based Approach 4.5 Discussion of Results 4.5.1 Results of Comparison 4.5.2 Case Studies 4.6 Limitations 5. Conclusions and Further Work 5.1 Conclusions 5.2 Further Work

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