私募制度通過至今已近八年，儼然已成為企業進行籌資的重要管道之一，而近年來又針對私募法規進行多項放寬修定，讓企業在選擇私募作為籌資方式的限制減少、彈性增加。回顧過去相關私募文獻，大多以私募折價及超額報酬兩者作為研究目標，其中，發現公司進行私募宣告後，觀察設定期間內之股價超額報酬，發現市場具有正向的資訊宣告效果；而私募折價則為取得資訊之成本代價，同時也與公司特性顯著相關，顯見宣告私募具有資訊內涵。因為過去鮮少有以私募為研究標的進行資訊揭露的探討，因此，本文將討論公司進行私募期間，新聞發佈之好壞是否與特定因素相關，抑或是偏向公開某特定屬性的資訊行為。

本文以民國95年初至97年底宣告私募股權籌資之上市上櫃公司為研究樣本，將分別從市場反應及分析者角度定義新聞報導好壞消息來檢驗是否與特定因素相關。主要研究結果如下：一、以市場反應定義新聞報導好壞消息來看，上市上櫃公司聯合樣本及上櫃公司樣本具顯著性，其中，公司市值大小、股東權益報酬率及公司是否具有財務危機變數與是否發佈正面訊息比例呈反向關係，而動能效應、私募股數比例與私募用途則為正向關係。表示大公司或公司營運狀況良好者，其發佈正面訊息之比例較低，而過去數月股價報酬較佳、私募股數比例較高與財務性融資的公司，較可能會發佈正面資訊。二、若進一步考量市場對新聞報導好壞消息的反應程度，在上市上櫃公司聯合樣本中，公司營運狀況良好者及私募金額較高者，較少發佈正面訊息；在此還發現，當私募對象存在公司管理者，也會減少其好消息的發佈。另外，私募股數比例較高與為了財務性融資目的之公司會有較多好消息的發佈。將上市及上櫃公司區分來看，發現上市公司反應大致與聯合樣本同，上櫃公司研究結果則發現，當公司有財務危機疑慮時，市場所反應好消息程度會較低；然而，在上市公司私募樣本中，則發現呈正向關係。三、最後，以分析者角度來檢驗異常發佈訊息之假說，結果顯示上市上櫃聯合樣本與上櫃公司迴歸結果具顯著性，而上市公司則不顯著。其中，在上市上櫃公司樣本中，只有具有動能效應及私募金額高之公司，分析師可能會注意到，並且繼續發表較多正面資訊，拉抬公司價值；上櫃公司則另外發現，當公司私募前內部人持股數比例相對較大者，就分析者認知，媒體發佈較多的好消息。

Private equity has become an important way of financing for company. Since a number of amendments have been approved in recent years, it reduces restriction of financing and increase flexibility. Most of past related research focused on the discount and abnormal return but pay little attention on effect of news release during offering price being decided. Therefore, this study used two types of variables to define good or bad news and discuss which factors are related with.
In this study, we took those companies listed TSE and Gre-Tai Securities Market and had announced private equity placement from January 2006 to December 2008 as research samples. we will use market response and analyst definition to examine whether good or bad news is related with specific factors. The major findings of this study are as follows：(Ⅰ) From market response, we found that the model for the joint sample of TSE and OTC companies and the sample of OTC companies are provided with goodness of fit. We also found that companies with higher market value, higher return on equity and having a financial crisis three are more likely to get negative news. But the private placement companies with momentum effect, higher fraction and financed for financial purpose are more likely to get positive news. These findings showed that large companies or companies operating in good condition may have relatively low percentage of good news. (Ⅱ) Furthermore, observing market magnitude of good or bad news, we obtained that the company operating in good condition and higher fraction will release less good news. In addition, we also found when managers participated in private placement will lead to reduce good news percentage. In OTC companies sample, we found if the company has doubts about the financial crisis will have less good news； However, in TSE companies sample the positive relationship was found. (Ⅲ) Finally, we used analysts point of view to check which factor is related with news property. We found that only the joint sample of TSE and OTC companies and sample of OTC companies have significant regression results. In the joint sample of TSE and OTC companies, only with momentum effect and higher amount of private placement, financial analysts would notice and continued to give more positive response, boosting the value of the company. Moreover, in OTC companies sample, we found that when insider ownership is relatively larger prior to private placement, there would be more good news on researcher’s perception.

中文部分
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