企業實施員工認股選擇權計畫，在於消弭員工與股東之間利益不一致的衝突，使公司經營績效與員工報酬相結合，達到企業留住優秀人才之目的。從過去文獻發現員工認股權價值與企業當期或未來盈餘間存在正向關係，然兩者所存在的正向關係究竟是計劃本身激勵員工努力工作？抑或是計畫使得員工(包含高階管理人員等)產生盈餘管理的動機？前者為企業所關注，因此本文利用裁量性應計項目模型，排除企業盈餘中可能受到員工進行盈餘管理而虛增的部分，以得到企業「真實」盈餘。
本文之研究問題分成三點，首先，探討給予日員工認股權價值與企業真實盈餘之關係；其次，台灣證券交易法規定上市、上櫃公司應於2011年底以前設置薪酬委員會，強制設置薪酬委員會後，給予日員工認股權價值與企業真實盈餘關聯性之影響；最後，以六項薪酬委員會品質特性作為衡量指標，分別為薪酬委員會人數規模、開會次數、實際出席率、資深董事比例、獨立董事比例以及繁忙董事比例，檢測薪酬委員會品質愈高，給予日員工認股權價值與企業真實盈餘之關聯性是否變得更加強烈。
研究期間為2008年至2013年，選取台灣上市、上櫃電子業公司共701家，採二階段最小平方法(Two-Stage Least Squares)以消除內生性問題。實證結果發現給予日員工認股權價值與當期及次期企業真實盈餘呈正相關；公司有設置薪酬委員會(2011年至2013年)相較於未設置薪酬委員會(2008年至2010年)，給予日員工認股權價值與當期及次期企業真實盈餘之正向關係具有正面影響；2011年至2013年間，薪酬委員會品質愈高，員工認股權價值與當期及次期企業真實盈餘之正向關係變得更加強烈。表示台灣上市、上櫃電子業公司在2008年至2013年期間，發放員工認股選擇權作為誘因式獎酬，確實能有效激勵員工努力向上，為企業創造真實盈餘績效，此外薪酬委員會扮演著重要監督角色。

The purpose of implementing employee stock option planning is to reduce the conflict of interests between employees and shareholders and to connect firm’s performance to employees’ rewards. Some studies find that employee stock option compensation and current/subsequent earnings have positive correlation. However, the reasons for this positive correlation are still in question. Is it because stock option encourages employees to be hard-working？ Or is it for earnings management？ The former is more concerned by firms. Therefore, we use discretionary accrual model to exclude the parts of earnings that may be inflated and get the “true” earnings.
Our research has three research objectives. The first is to discuss the relationship between the value of employee stock option at grant date and “true” earnings. Second, according to Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, listed companies must establish compensation committee before the end of 2011. We analyze the relationship between the value of employee stock option at grant date and “true” earnings after the forming of compensation committee. Third, we investigate whether the relationship between the value of employee stock option at grant date and “true” earnings is affected by the quality of the compensation committee. We use six characteristics to measure the compensation committee quality - the size of compensation committee, the number of meetings, members attendances’ rate, senior directors’ rate, independent directors’ rate, and busy directors’ rate.
The sample selection is 701 firms listed in Taiwan electronics industries. We use two-stage least squares method to address the issue of endogeneity. We find that the relationship between the value of employee stock option at grant date and current/subsequent true earnings is significantly positive. The relationship becomes stronger after the compensation committee formed (2011 to 2013) compared to the prior period (2008 to 2010). Moreover, the relationship becomes stronger as the quality of compensation committee increases. It means that the firms listed in Taiwan electronics industries from 2008 to 2013, which issued employee stock option as an incentive tool indeed encourage employees to work hard and create “true” earnings for enterprises. Besides, compensation committee plays an important role in supervision.

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