台灣企業大多為家族所掌控之特性，使得其面臨之代理問題不同與其他股權分散企業所面臨之代理問題。且臺灣自2000年開放庫藏股政策，使得公司有權可以在市場上買回自家的股票。而本研究利用二階段最小平方法(two-stage least square，簡稱2SLS),分析家族企業之控制股東對公司之股利政策與融資政策之影響，並且將樣本分為1996至1998年與2005年至2007年兩期，探討庫藏股政策與獨立董事之設立此兩項政策實施前後家族企業之股利政策予融資政策之變化。實證研究結果發現，家族企業之控制權與現金請求權分離程度越大時，其越有可能利用股利發放的模式，將公司內部資源外移，剝削少數股東之權益。但本研究並未發現家族企業之控制權與現金請求權之分離程度對於融資決策有顯著之影響。同時也發現外部股東對於股利政策之影響由1996年期間至1998年期間之負向關係，轉為2005年至2007年期間之顯著正向的關係，此一實證結果隱含著設立外部股東之規範，使得外部股東成為控制家族企業之間代理問題的機制。

Most of companies in Taiwan are controlled by families, the agency problems that family controlled companies face is different from the agency problems the dispersed ownership companies face. Taiwanese government opened the market stock repurchases policy at 2000. The present paper uses the two-stage least square analysis, to discuss how the family controllers affect the dividend policy and debt policy. This paper also separate the panel data in two groups, one is from 1996 to 1998, the other one is from 2005 to 2007, to see if there is any difference after Taiwanese government introducing the policy. The Empirical results indicate that when the more control right excess the cash flow right of the controller, the controller is more likely to extract the resources from company by dividend payout. But there is no significant relationship between the debt policy and the difference between control right and cash flow right. There is a significant positive relationship between the ratio of outside directors and dividend policy at 2005 to 2007 period.

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