依照2011年11月11日實施公司法第197條之1第2項的目的，係以限縮股票設質比重的方式，來杜絕公開發行公司董監透過股票質押的操作來控制公司經營權的現象。但由近期層出不窮的企業經營權之爭可見，此公司法的實施實務上似乎未能有效降低董監事利用股票質押進行財務槓桿的操作。
因此本研究先以多元迴歸模型來探究上市、櫃公司董監事股票質押比率在法規前與法規後，其分別的差異與變化的趨勢。結果發現上市公司之平均董監事股票質押股比率在法規實施後確實呈現降低的趨勢，但上櫃公司之平均董監事股票質押比率不減反增。
接著利用重複測量變異數分析，檢測上市、櫃公司在董監事全面改選的停止過戶日所在月份前後，董監事股票質押比率是否有顯著差異。結果證實，上、市櫃公司的董監事會刻在董監事全面改選前藉由股票質押借款來獲取更多控制權，然後為了規避法規造成的投票權減少而在停止過戶前以其他資金來源解質押藉此短暫降低股票質押比率，並在之後又恢復其原有水準。如此可說明法規的實施並沒有達到強化公司治理的立法目的與效果，造成上有政策，下有對策。
最後藉由縱橫資料分析發現，公司的經營績效確實與董監事股票質押比率有顯著的相關，且公司股價與大盤指數的波動也會間接影響董監事股票質押的比率。此外，高現金流量權的公司，會降低董監事個人的財富限制，因此董監事股票質押比率較低。但當現金流量權與控制權的比率愈接近，有額外資金需求的公司董監事，愈會以股票質押的方式進行融資。

According to the purpose of Article 197-1-II of the Company Law, which was implemented on November 11, 2011, it is to limit the proportion of pledging shares to prevent the directors and supervisors of public issued companies from controlling the company's management rights through the operation of share pledging. However, it can be seen from the recent disputes over the management rights of enterprises that this amendment to the Company Law has not effectively reduced the use of pledging shares by directors and supervisors for financial leverage operations.
Therefore, this study first uses a Multiple Regression Model to explore the differences and trends of the share pledge ratio of directors and supervisors of listed companies before and after the regulations. The results found that the average share pledge ratio of directors and supervisors of exchange-listed companies did show a downward trend after the regulation was revised, but the average share pledging ratios of directors and supervisors of OTC-listed companies increased.
Then, the Repeated Measures ANOVA is used to detect whether there was a significant difference in the share pledge ratio of directors and supervisors of listed companies before and after the month of the record date of book closure for the general election of directors and supervisors. The results confirmed that the board of directors and supervisors of exchange-listed companies and OTC-listed companies indeed obtained more control rights by pledging shares before the general election of directors and supervisors, then in order to circumvent the reduction of voting rights caused by regulations, the share pledging ratios of directors and supervisors was temporarily reduced by releasing pledged shares with other sources of funds before the record date of book closure, and then returned to its original level. This shows that the amendments to regulations have not achieved the legislative purpose and effect of strengthening corporate governance.
Finally, through the Panel Data Analysis, it is found that there is indeed a significant correlation between the company's operating performance and the share pledge ratio of directors and supervisors, and the fluctuation of the company's stock price and the market index will also indirectly affect the share pledge ratio of directors and supervisors. In addition, companies with high cash flow rights reduce the personal wealth restrictions of directors and supervisors, hence the share pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is lower. However, when the ratio of cash flow rights and control rights is closer, the directors and supervisors of company who have additional capital needs will use share pledge for financing.

高蘭芬、邱正仁（2002）。董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響。臺大管理論叢，13(1)，127－162。
陳安琳、高蘭芬、陳怡凱、陳烷鈺 （2013）。董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究。中山管理評論，21(2)，299－337。
梁信翔（2006）。董監事質押比率之研究。國立臺灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
Chan, K., Chen, H. K., Hu, S. Y., & Liu, Y. J. (2018). Share pledges and margin call pressure. Journal of Corporate Finance, 52, 96－117.
Chen, Y., & Hu, S. Y. (2007). The controlling shareholder’s personal stock loan and firm performance. Applied Economics, 39:8, 1059－1075. doi:10.1080/00036840500462004
Chiou, J. R., Hsiung, T. C., & Kao, L. F. (2002). A study on the relationship between financial distress and collateralized shares. 中華會計學刊, 3(1), 79－111.
Diana, G. (2015). Repeated measures analysis on determinant factors of enterprise value. Procedia Economics and Finance, 32, 338－344.
Dou, Y., Masulis, R. W., & Zein, J. (2019). Shareholder wealth consequences of insider pledging of company stock as collateral for personal loans. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(12), 4810－4854.
Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C., & Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to new information. International economic review, 10(1), 1－21.
Kao, L. F., Chiou, J. R., & Chen, A. L. (2004). The agency problems, firm performance and monitoring mechanisms: the evidence from collateralised shares in Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 389－402.
Kao, L. F., & Chen, A. L. (2007). Directors' Share Collateralization, Earnings Management and Firm Performance. 中華會計學刊, 6(2), 153－172.
Lee, T. S., & Yeh, Y. H. (2004). Corporate governance and financial distress: evidence from Taiwan. Corporate governance: An international review, 12(3), 378－388.
Mauchly, J. W. (1940). Significance test for sphericity of a normal n－variate distribution. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 11(2), 204－209.
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1983). Applied Linear Regression Models. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin. Inc, 392.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2011). Fire sales in finance and macroeconomics. Journal of economic perspectives, 25(1), 29－48.
Wu, M. C., Lin, H. C., Lin, I. C., & Lai, C. F. (2009). The effects of corporate governance on firm performance. Changua: National Changua University of Eductaion.