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研究生： 項家騏
Chia-chi Hsiang
論文名稱： 展望賽局理論決策模式之研究—以高科技廠房競標決策為例
Using Prospect Game Theory Decision Model Exploring Bidding Strategy Decision in Hi-tech Factory Building
指導教授： 鄭明淵
Min-Yuan Cheng
口試委員: 曾惠斌
Hui-Ping Tserng
王維志
Wei-Chih Wang
張行道
Shing-Tao Chang,
余文德
Wen-Ｄer Yu
陳鴻銘
Hung-Ming Chen
學位類別： 博士
Doctor
系所名稱： 工程學院 - 營建工程系
Department of Civil and Construction Engineering
論文出版年： 2011
畢業學年度： 99
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 191
中文關鍵詞： 累積展望理論 、賽局理論 、模糊偏好關係 、競標決策 、利潤率
外文關鍵詞： Cumulative Prospect Theory, Game Theory, Fuzzy Preference Relation, Bidding Decision Making, Markup scale
相關次數： 點閱：322  下載：19 
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    • 在營建業，政府單位及私人企業常採以工程常採公開方式招標並以最低價格標作為決標依據，將工程合約交由合格的營造廠商。當營造廠商在競標時須面對兩項決策：(1)是否參與該工程案的投標(2)當決定參與競標時，需提出之能達到讓公司的收益越高並能獲得工程標案等要求的最適投標價格(Bid Price)為何。投標價格通常包括工程成本(Construction Cost)及以工程成本的百分比表示的利潤率(Markup Scale)。投標策略(Bidding Strategy)對於利潤率的決定、工程的利潤及得標機率有著重大影響。主要決策者(Primary Decision-Maker) 在決定利潤率時受到對工程之不確定風險因素及競爭者風險偏好行為的主觀認知影響。因利潤率的決定受到許多因素的的影響，使得投標的決策過程複雜化。
    本研究結合累積展望理論(Cumulative Prospect Theory)及賽局理論(Game Theory)，創新建立一同時考量不同競爭者風險偏好及多競爭者行為決策之「展望賽局理論決策模式」(Prospect Game Theory Decision Model, PGT Decision Model)以協助營造廠商在競標時擬定最適競標策略與投標價格。最後以一模擬的案例以驗證本模式應用之可行性。

    In the construction industry, government agencies and private sector clients typically use competitive bidding in order to award a contract to the lowest price qualified bidder. Two critical decisions faced by bidders in competitive bidding are 1) whether or not to submit a bid and, when a decision is taken to submit, 2) what bid price to set in order to optimize both profit and likelihood of winning the bid. Bid price usually includes cost of construction and a markup, the scale of which is typically determined as a percentage of construction costs. Bidding strategy influences markup sacle significantly and impacts contractor profit and the probability of winning the competitive contract. Primary decision-makers typically decide markup size and factor anticipated project risk and the risk preferences of competitor bidders into their final price determination. Many variables affect contractor decisions regarding markup scale, which complicate the bidding decision process. This study proposes the Prospect Game Theory Model for Bidding Decision to assist contractors to make optimal bidding strategy decisions and set optimal bidding prices. Researchers using a simulated case to demonstrated the applicability of PGT Decision Model .

    第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究動機 1 1.2 研究目的 2 1.3 研究範圍與限制 3 1.4 研究內容與流程 4 1.5 論文架構 6 第二章 文獻回顧 7 2.1競標決策模式(Decision Making Models) 7 2.1.1機率模式(Probabilistic Model) 7 2.1.2決策分析模式(Judge Mental) 8 2.1.3人工智慧模式(Artificial Intelligence) 9 2.1.4賽局理論(Game Theory) 10 2.2效用函數 11 2.2.1效用函數之定義 11 2.2.2效用函數的基本假設 12 2.2.3 效用函數的型態 14 2.2.4期望效用理論(Expected Utility Theory, EU) 15 2.2.5主觀期望效用(subjective expected utility, SEU) 16 2.2.6展望理論(Prospect Theory, PT) 17 2.2.7相依排列期望效用理論(Rank Dependent Expect Utility Theory, RDEU) 19 2.2.8累積展望理論(Cumulative Prospect Theory, CPT) 20 2.3賽局理論(game theory, GT) 22 2.3.1賽局的基本元素 23 2.3.2賽局的種類 25 2.3.3賽局的表達方法 27 2.3.4賽局的均衡概念 28 2.4模糊偏好關係（Fuzzy Preference Relations, FPR） 29 第三章展望賽局理論決策模式 32 3.1階段一：確認競標廠商 34 3.2階段二：預測競標廠商競標策略的投標價格及採行機率 35 3.2.1擬訂競標策略形式 35 3.2.2擬定我方在各競標策略的投標價格及採行機率 36 3.2.3推估競標廠商於各競標策略的投標價格及採行機率 39 3.2.3.1競標廠商於各競標策略的投標價格推估 39 3.2.3.2競標廠商於各競標策略的採行機率推估 43 3.3階段三：競標廠商決策者的展望效用函數推估 43 3.3.1我方決策者的展望效用函數量測 44 3.3.2競標廠商決策者的展望效用函數推估 47 3.3.2.1競標廠商決策者的價值函數推估 47 3.3.2.2競標廠商決策者的機率權重函數推估 49 3.4階段四：競標廠商採行投標價格之預測 52 3.4.1計算各競標策略對所有廠商的價值 52 3.4.2計算各競標策略對所有廠商的機率權重 53 3.4.3計算所有廠商在各競標策略的展望值 53 3.5賽局分析 53 第四章 案例與模式驗證 55 4.1競爭者篩選 55 4.1.1確認投標廠商所需資格 55 4.1.2篩選潛在競爭者 55 4.1.3潛在競爭者的競標優勢評分 55 4.2預測競標廠商競標策略的投標價格及採行機率 59 4.2.1擬訂競標策略的利潤百分比 59 4.2.2廠商A擬定各競標策略的投標價格及採行機率 60 4.2.3推估競標廠商於各競標策略的投標價格及採行機率 69 4.2.3.1推估競標廠商各競標策略的投標價格 69 4.2.3.2推估競標廠商各競標策略的採行機率 78 4.3參與競標廠商廠商決策者展望效用函數的獲得 82 4.3.1廠商A決策者的展望效用函數量測 82 4.3.2推估競標廠商決策者的展望效用函數 85 4.3.2.1推估競標廠商決策者的價值函數 85 4.3.2.2推估競標廠商決策者的機率權重函數 87 4.4競標廠商投標價格的展望值計算 92 4.4.1計算競標廠商採行競標策略的價值 92 4.4.2計算競標廠商採行競標策略組合的客觀機率 93 4.4.3計算競標廠商各競標策略的展望值 99 4.5競標廠商投標價格的預測 103 第五章 結論與建議 106 5.1 結論 106 5.2 建議 107 參考文獻 108 附錄一：展望效用函數量測程式碼 I-1 附錄二：廠商的競爭優勢評分 II-1 附錄三：廠商B在各競標策略的投標價格差異度評估 III-1 附錄四：廠商D在各競標策略的投標價格差異度評估 IV-1 附錄五：廠商B的競標策略採行機率評估 V-1 附錄六：廠商D的競標策略採行機率評估 VI-1 附錄七：廠商B與廠商D的決策者對金錢重視的差異度評估 VII-1 附錄八：廠商B與廠商D的決策者對風險追求的差異度評估 VIII-1

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